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ABSTRACT 
 
The Influence of  
Individual Audit Committee Chairs, CEOs, and CFOs 
on Corporate Reporting and Operating Decisions. (August 2012) 
Bradley Phillip Lawson, B.A., Drury University; 
M.S., University of Houston 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Thomas C. Omer 
 
This paper examines the association between individual managers and corporate 
reporting and operating decisions.  To examine this question, I develop a dataset of 241 
individual CEOs and CFOs, as well as audit committee chairs, covering the period of 
1988 to 2009.  Although audit committee chairs are tasked with monitoring insiders and 
not actually preparing the financial results, research suggests that each of these 
management groups could exert their individual "styles" on the reporting and operating 
decisions.  Using this dataset, I find that each of these groups significantly influence 
accounting- and non-accounting-based corporate decisions.  Also, I examine whether the 
influence of these individuals is impacted by characteristics of the corporation’s 
operating environment.  Using individual proxies for managerial discretion and job 
demands, as well as developing index measures for each of these constructs, I find that 
the influence of these particular managers is not impacted by the amount of discretion 
they have or their perceived job demands.  Last, I find evidence that observable 
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demographic measures explain some of the managers’ decisions.  These results add to 
the literature concerning the importance of individual managers to corporate decisions 
because they suggest that managers besides the CFO can significantly influence 
reporting and operating decisions, and the influence of these managers extends beyond 
accrual-based techniques to include real activities management decisions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether individual manager-specific traits 
and characteristics (i.e., ―styles‖) influence corporate reporting and operating decisions.  
Specifically, I examine the associations between individual audit committee chairs, CEOs 
and CFOs, their observable characteristics, and various proxies for corporations’ 
accounting- and non-accounting-based reporting and operating decisions.  I also examine 
whether limits to managerial discretion and variation in the job demands experienced by 
these individuals intervene in those associations. 
 The first question I examine is whether individual managers influence corporate 
decisions; in particular, reporting and operating decisions.  Neoclassical economic and 
agency theories posit that individual behavior does not impact corporate policies because 
individuals act based on full knowledge and rational preferences to maximize their own 
utility, or when they do not, individuals can be properly monitored or incentivized to act 
in the best interests of shareholders.  However, recent studies, such as Bamber et al. 
(2010), Dyreng et al. (2010), and Ge et al. (2011), suggest otherwise.  Their results 
indicate that individual managers’ ―styles‖ are reflected in several corporate policies, 
decisions and choices, including voluntary disclosure choices, tax avoidance strategies, 
and accounting practices.  Similarly, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that individual 
managers  explain  some  of  the  variation in  corporations’  investment, financial, and 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of The Accounting Review. 
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organizational policies.  These results are consistent with Upper Echelon theory, which 
suggests that individual managers’ decisions and choices often reflect personal beliefs, 
values, and cognitive processing attributes.  Also, because individual managers are not 
necessarily interchangeable, corporate policies likely reflect the characteristics of these 
individuals, which could result in deviations from otherwise value-maximizing outcomes.   
The corporate reporting and operating decisions I examine include accounting-
based (i.e., accrual-based) and non-accounting-based decisions, as proxied by real 
activities management measures (Roychowdhury 2006).  Because studies suggest that 
management can influence earnings through both activities (Cohen et al. 2008; McGuire 
et al. 2012), I extend this area of literature and examine the impact of individual 
managers on both types of decisions.  Ge et al. (2011) examine a similar research 
question focusing only on the CFO position, and they conclude that individual CFOs are 
associated with companies’ accounting practices.  In their analyses, they control for the 
impact of CEOs on their CFOs’ decisions, but they do not directly examine whether 
individual CEOs have particular reporting styles.  Therefore, I also extend this line of 
literature by including both management positions in my analysis to determine whether 
individuals in each management group significantly influence the reporting process and 
operating decisions.  Additionally, I add to this area of literature by examining the 
influence of individual audit committee chairs.  Although they are not directly involved 
with managing the company, I include individual audit committee chairs in my analysis 
because studies suggest that boards of directors and audit committees can influence 
financial reporting quality (Klein 2002; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008; Xie et al. 2003), 
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investors appear to value higher quality audit committee members (DeFond et al. 2005), 
and the scope of the audit committee’s activities and responsibilities have increased 
considerably with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Beasley et al. 2009; Engel et 
al. 2010).   
 Next, I examine whether the association between these individuals and corporate 
reporting and operating decisions is influenced by limits to managerial discretion or 
perceived job demands of the individual manager.  Carpenter et al. (2004) indicate that 
companies’ external environment, organizational characteristics, and the amount of 
discretion and power the manager has within the company limit managers’ attempts to 
achieve desired outcomes.  Consistent with that discussion, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) 
find a significant association between the coefficients for some of their manager-specific 
fixed-effects and a measure for large institutional investors.  Similarly, Ge et al. (2011) 
examine proxies for managerial discretion and executive job demands, and their results 
suggest that both significantly impact the influence of individual managers.  Therefore, I 
incorporate in my test design several proxies for curtailments to the discretion afforded to 
managers and the amount of pressure and demands individual managers experience in 
their position.  Consistent with Hambrick (2007), I measure constraints on managers’ 
activities (i.e., limits to managerial discretion) based on corporate governance-related 
measures.   
 My third research question examines whether the association between individual 
managers’ ―styles‖ and corporate reporting and operating decisions is explained by 
individual demographic characteristics.  One of the central premises of Upper Echelon 
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theory is that the bounded rationality of the individual is driven by their ―cognitions, 
values, and perceptions,‖ (Carpenter et al. 2004) and because individuals act based on 
bounded rationality, their individual traits can have a significant influence on corporate 
policies.  Additionally, the theory posits that observable characteristics of the individuals 
(―demographics‖) can serve as noisy proxies for the way in which executives process 
information.  Although the results in Bertrand and Schoar (2003) suggest that CEOs with 
an MBA are more aggressive while older CEOs appear less aggressive, the results of 
more recent studies suggest that these measures, as well as other demographics, have 
little explanatory power concerning corporate policies.  To examine this further, I collect 
biographical information on the manager’s age, educational background, CPA/MBA 
obtainment, military background, and international experience and examine whether 
these demographic measures explain managers’ reporting and operating ―styles‖.   
Following prior research, I identify a sample of 241 individual audit committee 
chairs, CEOs, and CFOs for the period 1988 to 2009.  The results for my first research 
question are consistent with Upper Echelon theory and suggest that these individuals 
influence corporate reporting and operating decisions.  Specifically, I find that individual 
CEOs and CFOs both influence accounting-based and non-accounting-based decisions.  
Similarly, I find individual audit committee chairs are associated with these same 
decisions.  These results shed new light on the influence of individual managers on 
accrual- and real activity-management decisions because they suggest that individual 
managers besides the CFO can significantly influence these decisions. (Ge et al. 2011)  
Additionally, these results add to the literature because they suggest that none of these 
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management groups overshadow or dominate the influence of another.  That is, each 
management group appears significant in the model, even when controlling for the 
influence of the other group.   
When examining the influence of limits to managerial discretion and job demands 
on individual managers’ styles, I find that these individuals influence corporate reporting 
and operating decisions irrespective of the measures for discretion and job demands.  
These results are contrary to expectations based on Upper Echelon theory and suggest 
that some individual managers’ characteristics are reflected in corporate decisions 
regardless of the company’s operating environment.  The results remain whether I 
segregate my sample based on managerial discretion, job demands, or corresponding 
index values above and below the sample median. 
I also provide evidence that certain demographic characteristics, such as the 
manager’s age, MBA and CPA status, explain some of the manager’s reporting and 
operating decisions. More importantly, though, the directional nature of the association 
between the demographics and the decisions varies depending on the management group.  
For instance, CEOs with MBAs make more aggressive reporting and operating decisions, 
while CFOs with MBAs make more conservative decisions.  These results are important 
because they suggest that characteristics of the manager differentially affect their 
decisions, depending on their position within the company.  Additionally, I provide some 
evidence that demographic characteristics reflect themselves more in particular settings.  
For example, I find having a Juris Doctorate degree is significant for CEOs making 
decisions in highly litigious industries. 
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This study makes several contributions to the literature.  First, along with 
accounting-based measures, I also examine whether individual managers influence non-
accounting-based activities, as proxied by real earnings management measures.   My 
results are consistent with Cohen et al. (2008) and Graham et al. (2005) and provide new 
evidence concerning individual managers’ styles and how their styles extend beyond 
accounting-based reporting to also influence operating decisions.  Second, I contribute to 
the literature by examining multiple sets of individuals who are directly tasked with and 
held responsible for overseeing and preparing financial statements.  By examining audit 
committee chairs, CEOs and CFOs in the same model, I show that each group has a 
significant influence on both reporting and operating results, and I provide evidence that 
these groups tend to influence reporting and operating decisions differentially.  These 
results contribute to the literature because they suggest that individuals within each of 
these groups can significantly impact reporting and operating decisions, even though (1) 
audit committee chairs are tasked with monitoring and overseeing inside management 
and (2) CFOs report to the CEO. 
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In addition to documenting the importance of different management groups, I 
contribute to the literature by examining multiple proxies for limits to managerial 
discretion and job demands. These factors are important because they may intervene in 
the association between individual manager characteristics and corporate policies and 
decisions.  Also, I develop firm-specific index measures which proxy for each of these 
constructs.  Finally, I contribute by examining multiple observable demographic 
measures and their ability to directly explain corporate reporting and operating decisions, 
as well as individual manager’s styles.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the 
literature review and theory development.  Section 3 explains the research method and 
sample details.  Section 4 provides descriptive statistics.  Section 5 examines the primary 
results, while Section 6 provides sensitivity analyses.  Section 7 documents the 
conclusions.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Why Individuals Should or Should Not Influence Corporate Decisions 
Economic theory suggests all parties involved in a transaction (i.e., individuals or 
corporations) behave optimally where the marginal benefits received from an action 
equal the marginal costs associated with that action.  As such, managers are perfect 
substitutes because the outcomes are dictated by the economic resources and incentives 
available to the corporation.  Similarly, Modigliani and Miller (1961; 1958) describe an 
ideal world with no market frictions where the total value of the corporation is 
independent of the corporation’s financing choices.  Even in the case where frictions do 
exist, as implied by agency cost theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976), individual managers 
do not matter to corporate policies because they can all be induced to take similar actions 
(Bamber et al. 2010). 
Contrary to these theories, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) examine individual 
executives across companies and over time and suggest that individual managers 
significantly influence corporation’s investment, financial and organizational policies.  
Similarly, Bamber et al. (2010), Dyreng et al. (2010), and Ge et al. (2011) find that 
individual managers are significant determinants of corporations’ voluntary disclosure 
choices, tax avoidance strategies, and accounting practices, respectively.  These studies 
rely on Upper Echelon (UE) theory from the management science literature (Hambrick 
and Mason 1984) to explain why individual managers appear to significantly influence 
corporations’ policies and decisions. 
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Upper Echelon theory implies that managers’ decisions and actions are often a 
reflection of their personal beliefs and characteristics, and because individual managers 
are not necessarily interchangeable, companies become a reflection of the top 
management team members, which may result in corporate policies deviating from 
otherwise value-maximizing outcomes.  Additionally, Hambrick (2007) indicates that the 
original UE theory is based on the idea of bounded rationality.  That is, due to cognitive 
limitations, individuals do not always properly interpret or act upon a complete set of 
knowledge.  Rather, individuals filter information and strategic analyses through their 
own personal ―experiences, values and personalities,‖ which can result in managers’ 
personal tendencies evidencing themselves in corporate policies.  Several studies provide 
indirect evidence of this theory by showing an association between CEO’s personal 
leverage choices and leverage structures of the CEO’s firm (Cronqvist et al. 2010); 
CEO’s overconfidence and corporate investment decisions (Malmendier and Tate 2005); 
and reputation of the CEO and the quality of the corporation’s earnings (Francis et al. 
2008).  Based on Upper Echelon theory and these recent studies, my first research 
question examines whether individual managers influence corporate reporting and 
operating decisions.   
2.1.1 Which Managers to Examine 
Similar to prior studies in this stream of literature (Bamber et al. 2010; Bertrand 
and Schoar 2003; Dyreng et al. 2010; Ge et al. 2011; Jensen and Zajac 2004), I examine 
the CEO and CFO positions because both management positions are held accountable for 
the reported financial results (Representatives 2002).  However, unlike prior studies, I 
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also examine individual audit committee chairs.  Although audit committees are tasked 
with monitoring and not preparing the financial statements, studies suggest that 
characteristics of the board of directors and audit committees are associated with 
corporations’ earnings management activities (Abbott et al. 2004; Carcello et al. 2009; 
Klein 2002; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008; Xie et al. 2003) and investors positively 
value the appointment of audit committee members with ―accounting‖-based financial 
expertise (DeFond et al. 2005).  Also, I focus on audit committee chairs because they are 
most responsible for overseeing the financial reporting process (Schmidt and Wilkins 
2011) and are held responsible for breakdowns in the financial reporting process (Farber 
2005; Srinivasan 2005); particularly, in the post-SOX period (Beasley et al. 2009; Engel 
et al. 2010).   
Although recent studies examining the implications from Upper Echelon theory 
find that CEOs and other inside managers significantly influence corporate policies, those 
results may not apply in this setting because they do not control for the significance of 
each manager group, even though they all operate contemporaneously in the corporate 
environment and thus the actions of one group may be a proxy for the influence of 
another.  That is, along with reporting constraints provided by ―GAAP requirements, 
external audit[ors], and SEC regulations‖ (Ge et al. 2011),  CFOs, who are directly tasked 
with preparing the financial reports, could be overshadowed or dominated by a 
particularly influential CEO who determines the organizational ―tone at the top‖.  (Feng 
et al. 2011; Ge et al. 2011; Hunton et al. 2010)  Regarding the influence of audit 
committee chairs, Beasley et al. (2009) examine survey evidence and find that while 
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some audit committee members indicate appropriate monitoring of the reporting process, 
other members view their governance function as split between an actual monitoring role 
and a largely ―ceremonial‖ or ineffective role. 
2.1.2 Which Reporting and Operating Decisions 
Although managers are subject to numerous constraints, they must make 
decisions throughout the entire reporting and operating process that could influence the 
reported results.  Studies suggest that management alternates between accounting-based 
and non-accounting-based (i.e., real activities-based) earnings management activities to 
influence the reported financial results depending on the time period and the companies’ 
operating environment. (Cohen et al. 2008; Graham et al. 2005; McGuire et al. 2012)  To 
proxy for management’s accounting-based decisions, I rely on signed and absolute 
discretionary accrual values from the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995), and I 
examine management’s use of accruals in the mapping of cash flows into the financial 
statements (Dechow and Dichev 2002).  Because managers can employ both methods, I 
also examine individual managers’ influence on non-accounting-based activities, as 
proxied by real earnings management measures related to abnormal cash flow, production 
costs, and discretionary expenses (Roychowdhury 2006).  For a detailed discussion of all 
the measures employed in this study, see the Appendix.  
Following the above discussion, my first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: Individual audit committee chairs, CEOs, and CFOs are significantly 
associated with corporate reporting and operating decisions. 
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2.2 Intervening Variables to Individual Managers’ Influence 
Carpenter et al. (2004) suggest there are intervening variables in the association 
between individual managers and corporate policies.  These variables relate to the 
companies’ external environment, organizational characteristics, and the amount of 
power, discretion, and incentives the manager has to influence and achieve desired 
organizational outcomes.  Hambrick (2007) categorizes these variables as ―managerial 
discretion‖ and ―executive job demands‖.  Bertrand and Schoar (2003) indicate a positive 
association between individual managers’ styles and a measure for large institutional 
investors, which supports this notion.  Similarly, Carpenter et al. (2003) show that the 
association between top management team characteristics and strategies of technology 
IPO firms is dependent on characteristics of the board of directors, and Petersen et al. 
(2003) show that the dynamics of the top management team mediate the positive 
association between individual CEO’s influence and firm performance.   
2.2.1 Proxies for Limits to Managerial Discretion 
Hambrick (2007) notes that ―discretion exists when there is an absence of 
constraint and when there is a great deal of means-end ambiguity—that is, when there are 
multiple plausible alternatives.‖  Hambrick (2007) also notes that ―discretion…emanates 
from environmental conditions, from organizational factors, and from the executive 
himself or herself,‖ and when managerial discretion is higher, the association between 
individual manager characteristics and corporate policies should be greater.  Following 
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this, I predict a stronger association between individual managers’ styles and corporate 
reporting and operating decisions when managerial discretion is higher.   
To operationalize Hambrick’s (2007) definition of managerial constraints, I 
assume that managers’ discretion is inversely related to governance characteristics of the 
corporation, consistent with Lara et al. (2009).  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define 
corporate governance as the ―way in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment.‖  As such, I limit my governance 
measures to those groups who are most likely to have a direct or indirect interest in the 
financial activities of the corporation; namely, auditors, the board of directors, and 
shareholders.  Greater governance or monitoring activities by these parties should allow 
fewer individual manager characteristics to influence their corporation’s policies. 
Therefore, I propose the following measures to proxy for managerial constraints (See the 
Appendix for detailed definitions of these measures): 
 Big N vs. Non-Big N Auditors –Several prior studies show that Big N auditors 
provide higher audit quality and constrain earnings management activities more 
than non-Big N auditors (Becker et al. 1998; DeAngelo 1981; Francis and Wang 
2008; Teoh and Wong 1993);  
 Auditor Industry Specialization – Prior studies suggest that clients of industry 
specialist auditors provide higher quality financial information, which suggests 
greater monitoring of management activities and greater restrictions on 
managements’ tendency to influence the reporting of earnings (Balsam et al. 
2003; Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005b; Reichelt and Wang 2010)   
 Size of the Board of Directors – Extensive literature shows that characteristics of 
the Board of Directors impact their ability to monitor management and represent 
shareholders’ interests.  Size of the board is one of those characteristics and 
studies suggest that larger boards are less capable of monitoring management 
(Jensen 1993; Lipton and Lorsch 1992; Yermack 1996);   
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 CEO/Chair Duality – Studies suggest that CEOs who also hold the position of 
Board Chair are able to exert greater influence over the corporation’s decisions 
and policies due to less objective monitoring of the CEO’s activities by the other 
board members (Ryan and Wiggins 2004); 
 Extent of Institutional Ownership – Institutional investors have ―the 
opportunity, resources, and ability to monitor, discipline, and influence managers 
of firms‖ (Chung et al. 2002) and studies find an association between institutional 
monitoring and corporations’ investment decisions, financial performance and 
reporting, and executive compensation policies (Ajinkya et al. 2005; Chung et al. 
2002; Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach 2009).  
Consistent with the above prediction, my formal hypothesis concerning 
managerial discretion is as follows: 
H2a: Individual audit committee chairs, CEOs, and CFOs have a greater effect 
on corporate reporting and operating decisions when limits to managerial 
discretion are lower. 
2.2.2 Proxies for Executive Job Demands 
Hambrick et al. (2005) note that while top level executives achieve these positions 
due to exceptional talent, ―the reality is that executives vary widely in their ability and in 
the suitability of their talents for the specific contexts they face.‖ (Hambrick et al. 2005)  
Additionally, Hambrick et al. (2005)  suggest that all individuals are subject to bounded 
rationality to some degree, and whether that derives from limitations on ―cognitive 
wherewithal, time, or other resources‖, high job demand situations exacerbate cognitive 
limitations and can result in incomplete or irrational decision behavior from the manager.  
Thus, I expect job demands to intervene in the association between individual managers 
and corporate policies.   
Consistent with Hambrick et al. (2005), I suggest the ―degree to which a given 
executive experiences his or her job as difficult or challenging‖ (Hambrick et al. 2005) is 
15 
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proxied by the following measures (See the Appendix for detailed definitions of these 
measures). 
 Complexity of the Corporation – Consistent with task challenges being an 
important determinant of job demands, more complex corporations place greater 
job demands on individual executives (Hambrick et al. 2005); 
 Market Pressures – The pressure to produce financial results that meet 
shareholders’ expectations is consistent with the performance challenge aspect of 
job demands;   
 Size of the Corporation – Size of the corporation represents another potential 
proxy for job demands.  While executives of smaller corporations also face high 
job demands (e.g., demands arising from limited resources), executives of larger 
corporations experience greater pressure to succeed and are required to process 
larger amounts of data than their counterparts at smaller corporations;   
 Litigation Pressure – Executives of U.S.-based companies face constant threats 
of litigation.  However, certain industries are considered more litigious than 
others.  (Reichelt and Wang 2010)  Thus, the threat of ongoing or expected 
litigation should increase executive job demands; 
 Executive Job Demands Required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 – SOX 
increased the personal liability of CEOs and CFOs for publishing fraudulent or 
misleading financial statements due to new certification requirements, and SOX 
decreased the number of days after year-end that corporations have to file their 
financial statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).   
Because SOX provisions increase regulatory scrutiny over the financial reporting 
process, and because prior studies suggest a change in corporations’ reporting 
tendencies before and after SOX’s effective date (Cohen et al. 2008), I assume 
that executive job demands increase during the post-SOX period.    
My formal hypothesis concerning job demands is: 
H2b: Individual audit committee chairs, CEOs, and CFOs have a greater effect 
on corporate reporting and operating decisions when executive job 
demands are greater. 
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2.3 Individual Executive’s Observable Characteristics 
Upper Echelon theory posits that observable manager characteristics (i.e., 
demographics) can serve as noisy proxies for the way in which individuals process 
information.  Some of the previous characteristics examined include the manager’s age, 
MBA and CPA attainment, overconfidence, and gender, but prior studies examining these 
characteristics have found no consistent evidence concerning their ability to explain 
corporate policies. (Bamber et al. 2010; Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Dyreng et al. 2010; 
Ge et al. 2011)  Therefore, I further explore this issue and examine whether the impact of 
individual managers on corporate reporting and operating decisions is associated with 
observable demographic measures.  Following prior studies, I collect biographical 
information from a variety of sources (e.g., Forbes, Bloomberg, SEC filings, and 
LinkedIn) on each manager in the sample, then using this information, I examine the 
following demographic measures in my analysis due to data availability and 
comparability of my results with prior studies: 
 Age – Indicator variable equal to one if the manager was born before WWII 
(Bamber et al. 2010); 
 Military Background – Indicator variable equal to one if the manager has 
military experience (Bamber et al. 2010); 
 MBA – Indicator variable equal to one if the manager holds an MBA (Bamber et 
al. 2010; Bertrand and Schoar 2003); 
 CPA – Indicator variable equal to one if the manager is a CPA (Ge et al. 2011); 
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 Juris Doctorate Degree – Indicator variable equal to one if the manager holds a 
JD degree; 
 Doctorate Degree – Indicator variable equal to one if the manager holds a 
doctorate-level (non-honorary) degree; 
 Quality of Education – Indicator variable equal to one if the executive obtained 
their undergraduate or graduate degree from a top 10 MBA institution (Dyreng et 
al. 2010)1;   
 International Assignment Experience – An indicator variable equal to one if the 
manager completed an international assignment prior to serving in their current 
role (Carpenter et al. 2001; Tihanyi et al. 2000). 
Because prior studies do not provide consistent evidence concerning the 
significance or directional nature of the association between these demographic measures 
and corporate policies, I do not predict an association for these measures.  Rather, I rely 
on the following null hypothesis: 
H3: Corporate reporting and operating decisions are not associated with 
observable demographics of the manager. 
  
                                                     
1 Results are similar when I use an indicator variable equal to one if the manager went to an Ivy League 
university. 
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3. RESEARCH METHOD AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
3.1 Primary Model 
For my primary tests, I rely on the following general model: 
FIN_RPTit = 0 + k k CONTROLSit + t t YEARt + i i FIRMi  
 + m m ACm + m m CEOm + m m CFO + it  (1) 
where FIN_RPT is one of the discretionary accrual, accrual quality or real earnings 
management measures discussed previously.  The coefficients of interest in this model 
are the m, which represent coefficients on the separate indicator variables for each audit 
committee chair (ACm) CEO (CEOm), and CFO (CFOm).  I also include year (YEAR) and 
firm fixed-effects (FIRM) in the model.  Consistent with recent studies, I include 
manager-specific indicator variables and firm fixed-effects in the same model to allow 
the coefficients for the manager indicator variables to represent the incremental effect of 
each manager on the FIN_RPT measure and to proxy for their unique reporting and 
operating style. 
 CONTROLS in the model are common to the earnings management literature and 
include return on assets (ROA) to control for operating performance of the company and 
a measure for size (SIZE_AT) based on the natural log of total assets.  To control for 
growth prospects, I include measures for book-to-market ratio (BTM) and sales growth 
rate (GROWTH), and I control for debt leverage based on the company’s total debt to 
total assets (SC_LEV).   
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3.2 CEO and CFO Sample  
Following Bamber et al. (2010) and Dyreng et al. (2010), I rely on the 
ExecuComp database for the period of 1992 to 2009 to track individual CEOs and CFOs 
across firms and over time.  My sample selection is reported in Table 1, Panel A.  I begin 
with 23,522 individual manager-firm-year observations (2,621 individual managers; 
2,058 individual firms), which represents managers in the Execucomp database that 
changed firms during the period.  Following prior studies, I require three years of data 
before and after the manager assumed their position at the firm.  Also, I focus my 
analysis on CEOs and CFOs, and I require them to have served in either one of those 
positions at the parent company of their previous firm.  These procedures result in a CEO 
and CFO sample that contains 12,126 firm-years, 337 unique executives, and 605 unique 
firms.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample Details 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
 Exec-Firm-
Years 
Unique 
Execs. 
Unique 
Firms 
All Execucomp executives that changed companies during the 
period 23,522 2,621 2,058 
Less: Executives without 3 years of data before and after change (9,405) (1,321) (611) 
Less: Non-CEO or CFO executives (4,572) (458) (305) 
Less: Executives who were not a CEO or CFO in their prior 
position (5,979) (505) (537) 
Plus: Filler years for each executive 8,560 -- -- 
Sub-Total: Firm-years with CEOs & CFOs available for 
testing 12,126 337 605 
    
 Audit Chair-
CIKS 
  
All individual "Audit"-related activity per D&O Change 
database 2,224   
Less: Activity without Compustat data (814)   
Less: Non-appointment activity & chairs who do not meet 3 yr. 
requirement (1,027)   
Less: Board re-organizations (155)   
Less: Audit chairs without prior company data (156)   
Sub-Total: Individual Audit Chair-CIK Appointments 72 
Unique 
Audit Chairs 
 
Plus: Compustat years for each appointment 2,296 
Unique 
Firms 
Sub-Total: Firm-years with Audit Chairs available for testing 2,368 66 138 
    
Total Firm-Years available for testing 14,494   
    
Merging both samples with Compustat    
Less: Duplicate filler years (4,808)   
Less: Final screen to ensure compliance with 3 yr. requirement at 2 
separate firms (2,595)   
Less: Firm-years in 1987 (158)   
Total Firm-Years for Testing 6,933 241 443 
    
Panel B: Frequency of Position Changes 
  
 Current Title 
Prior Title AC CEO CFO Total 
     
Other 15 0 0 15 
CFO 36 16 104 156 
CEO 13 52 3 68 
AC 2 0 0 2 
Total 66 68 107 241 
     
Panel A details the sample selection process.  Panel B presents the managers’ prior and current positions at the firms 
in my sample.  Panel C provides information on the demographic data obtained for each of the individual managers.  
For the final sample, I require at least 3 years of observations for each manager at 2 separate firms.  Also, I require at 
least 3 years of observations outside the manager’s tenure (―filler years‖). 
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3.3 Audit Committee Chair Sample  
 Because the audit committee chair position is typically not identified in the 
Execucomp database, I rely on the Director & Officer Change (D&O) database provided 
by Audit Analytics to construct my audit committee chair sample.2  I first identify all 
audit-related activity, which results in 2,224 unique audit chair-CIK transactions during 
the period (See Table 1, Panel A.).  Because CIK information is not available for every 
firm within the Compustat database, I drop observations (814 obs.) that do not contain at 
least some Compustat data.  Also, because the D&O database separately identifies when 
an individual resigns from the audit chair position, as well as the appointment of the new 
audit chair, I drop all non-appointment-related activity, along with individual audit chairs 
that did not stay in their position for at least three years to be consistent with the 
CEO/CFO sample (1,027 obs.).  Next, I drop observations related to board 
reorganizations (155 obs.) because many of these audit chairs were already serving in the 
audit chair capacity prior to the reorganization.  Also, using data provided in the firm’s 8-
K filing, I gather information on where the individual worked prior to the audit chair 
appointment,  which  drops an additional  156 observations because the prior  company  
 
                                                     
2 This database provides information on executive changes that firms announce via the filing of Form 8-K 
with the SEC and covers the period of 2002 to 2009.  Unlike the Execucomp or Compustat databases that 
contain information on each company in the database for each year that they have information available, 
the D&O database only identifies individual changes in firms’ executive teams.  That means years in which 
no executive change occurs are not included in their database.  As such, the steps to create a sample of 
individual audit chairs vary from the steps discussed above. 
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cannot be identified or missing Compustat data.  These steps result in the identification of 
72 unique audit chair-CIK appointments during the sample period, which represents an 
audit committee chair sample containing 2,368 firm-years, with 66 unique audit chairs 
and 138 unique firms.3  
Combining the separate samples results in 6,933 firm-years available for testing 
with 241 unique managers and 443 unique firms.  This sample allows me to separate the 
incremental effect of each management group because some of the managers overlap in 
their tenure at a particular firm within the sample.  For information regarding the current 
and prior positions of the 241 managers, see the position change information presented in 
Table 1, Panel B. 
  
                                                     
3 Because the career path of those serving as audit chairs varies more so than those serving in either the 
CEO or CFO position, I do not require my individual audit chairs to serve in either the CEO or CFO 
position for their first firm.  Although several of the audit chairs included in my sample do serve in either 
the CEO or CFO position prior to becoming an audit chair, I classify those who do not serve in these 
positions as an ―Other‖ job category.  Specific examples of positions within this category include: 
subsidiary CEOs & CFOs, presidents, COOs, Treasurers, and General Counsel.  Although including these 
additional audit chairs in my sample allows me to increase my sample size, it would also bias against me 
finding that audit chairs significantly influence corporations’ financial reporting processes if these 
individuals do not have the ability to influence overall corporate policies in their prior firm.   
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4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 Descriptive statistics for the combined sample are provided in Table 2, Panel A.  
First, comparing my dependent variables with prior studies, the mean values for signed 
(DISC_ACR: 0.026) and absolute discretionary accruals (ABS_DISC_ACR: 0.104), as 
well as the real earnings management measures (R_CFO: 0.048; R_PROD: -0.051; and 
R_DX: 0.030), appear similar to those reported in Cohen et al. (2008).  Similarly, the 
mean value for accrual quality (R_CHG_WC: 0.001) appears consistent with the mean 
value for the control firms reported in Jones et al. (2008). 4 
 Next, the mean value for BIG_N indicates that approximately 92 percent of the 
firm-years in my sample are audited by ―Big N‖ audit firms, consistent with prior 
literature.  The remaining proxies for auditor industry specialization indicate mean values 
of 0.196 (DOMINANCE), 0.249 (MKT_SHARE), 0.219 (MOST_CLTS), 0.183 
(CL_SHARE), and 54.517 (NCLIENTS) and are consistent with those reported in 
Balsam et al. (2003).  For INST, BOD_SIZE and CEO_DUAL, the mean values are 
0.458, 9.309, and 0.633, respectively. 
 Last, for the job demands proxies, results indicate mean values of 2.325 and 2.622 
for the number of business segments (N_SEG_BUS) and number of geographic segments 
                                                     
4 Similar to Ge et al. (2011), I do not screen my final sample for missing data.  The lack of this step results 
in differences in the number of observations for each variable reported in Table 2, Panel A.  I do not 
perform this step in order to conserve the number of observations and individual managers available for 
testing, but I do require the exclusion of observations with missing data when I run my regression model.  
Although my initial sample creation steps require three years of data to be included in the sample, missing 
data could drop the number of observations available before and during the manager’s tenure to something 
less than three depending on the dependent variable being examined. 
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(N_SEG_GEO), respectively.  Market to book (MTB) has a mean value of 3.155, and the 
mean value for litigation exposure (LIT) indicates that approximately 26 percent of my 
firms operate in highly litigious industries.  The mean value of 0.421 for SOX indicates 
that approximately 42 percent of my sample observations occur in 2002 or later. 
To examine the comparability of my sample with other publicly-traded 
companies, I present descriptive statistics and test of means between my dataset and the 
complete Execucomp dataset of companies.  The results of these tests are presented in 
Table 2, Panel B.  I find ROA, SIZE_AT, and BTM are significantly smaller than the 
corresponding values for the Execucomp database.  Alternatively, GROWTH and 
SC_LEV are significantly larger.  These results suggest that the average firm in my 
sample is smaller than the average firm in the Execucomp database. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Test Variables      
Panel B:  
Execucomp Universe 
Variable N Mean 
Std 
Dev 
25th 
Pctl Median 
75th 
Pctl  N Mean 
         
Dependent Variables         
DISC_ACR 6,254 0.026 0.168 -0.035 0.011 0.073  28,660 0.026 
ABS_DISC_ACR 6,254 0.104 0.153 0.021 0.052 0.121  28,660 0.094** 
R_CHG_WC 5,867 0.001 0.057 -0.025 -0.003 0.023  27,766 -0.001** 
R_CFO 6,366 0.048 0.151 -0.005 0.047 0.107  30,537 0.061** 
R_PROD 6,189 -0.051 0.227 -0.146 -0.041 0.044  30,546 -0.046 
R_DX 6,501 0.030 0.322 -0.100 -0.009 0.112  31,685 0.002** 
Control Variables         
ROA 6,652 0.021 0.151 0.005 0.043 0.087  32,470 0.036** 
SIZE_AT 6,828 7.192 2.101 5.877 7.204 8.656  32,696 7.301** 
BTM 6,492 0.201 6.275 0.247 0.422 0.656  32,205 0.524** 
GROWTH 6,622 0.176 0.529 -0.002 0.084 0.212  32,401 0.151** 
SC_LEV 6,798 0.574 0.264 0.392 0.570 0.721  32,624 0.562** 
Governance Variables         
BIG_N 6,933 0.916 0.277 1.000 1.000 1.000  32,727 0.909** 
DOMINANCE 6,644 0.196 0.397 0.000 0.000 0.000  31,089 0.180** 
MKT_SHARE 6,644 0.249 0.161 0.129 0.219 0.350  31,089 0.243** 
MOST_CLTS 6,644 0.219 0.414 0.000 0.000 0.000  31,089 0.220 
CL_SHARE 6,644 0.183 0.087 0.124 0.167 0.222  31,089 0.178** 
NCLIENTS 6,644 54.517 51.211 14.000 38.000 81.000  31,089 50.413** 
INST 6,933 0.458 0.329 0.063 0.526 0.733  32,727 0.507** 
BOD_SIZE 4,830 9.309 2.758 7.000 9.000 11.000  21,298 9.466** 
CEO_DUAL 4,844 0.633 0.482 0.000 1.000 1.000  19,629 0.631 
Job Demand Variables         
N_SEG_BUS 6,218 2.325 1.650 1.000 1.000 3.000  28,701 2.292 
N_SEG_GEO 6,028 2.622 1.525 2.000 2.000 3.000  27,875 2.629 
MTB 6,493 3.155 4.289 1.416 2.207 3.696  32,204 3.010** 
LIT 6,933 0.261 0.439 0.000 0.000 1.000  32,727 0.216** 
SOX 6,933 0.421 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000  32,727 0.443** 
          
** significant difference at 5% level 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in this analysis.  These values represent observations for 
the period of 1988 to 2009.  Continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%.  Panel B provides mean 
values and test of mean differences between my sample and a comparable sample of Execucomp database firms.  See 
the Appendix for detailed information regarding variable definitions. 
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5. RESULTS 
 
5.1 Analysis of Individual Managers’ Influence on Corporate Reporting and 
Operating Decisions 
 To examine the association between individual managers and corporate reporting 
and operating decisions (H1), I follow prior studies and examine three test statistics and 
measures produced by regressing model (1) on my sample.  As presented in Table 3, I 
separately run model (1) for each of my six FIN_RPT measures.  Additionally, columns 
(1) through (4) in each panel represent the separate inclusion of components from the 
model.  The results in column (1) represent the model including the CONTROL 
variables, FIRM and YEAR fixed-effects, and all manager-specific fixed-effects.  
Columns (2) through (4) include the same CONTROL, FIRM, and YEAR variables but 
individually introduce audit chair-effects, CEO-effects, and CFO-effects to the model.  
For brevity, I do not discuss the specific results for each model as the results are similar 
across all models and panels. 
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TABLE 3 
Individual Manager’s Influence on Reporting and Operating Decisions 
 
 All Manager 
Effects 
AC Effects 
Only 
CEO Effects 
Only 
CFO Effects 
Only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Discretionary Accruals (DISC_ACR) 
N per model 6,032 6,032 6,032 6,032 
Test Controls = 0     
F-stat 63.33*** 68.53*** 72.22*** 66.39*** 
Test Manager Fixed Effects = 0     
F-stat 2.59*** 3.20*** 2.12*** 2.63*** 
Test of Manager Coefficients     
N 237 66 66 105 
Expected Significance a 12 3 3 5 
Actual Significance b 41 15 12 19 
Mean Effect -0.006 -0.005 0.006 -0.014 
25th Percentile -0.040 -0.067 -0.035 -0.044 
75th Percentile 0.031 0.047 0.036 0.028 
     
Panel B: Absolute Discretionary Accruals (ABS_DISC_ACR) 
N per model 6,032 6,032 6,032 6,032 
Test Controls = 0     
F-stat 11.74*** 14.23*** 14.26*** 14.30*** 
Test Manager Fixed Effects = 0     
F-stat 2.25*** 3.14*** 1.77*** 2.21*** 
Test of Manager Coefficients     
N 237 66 66 105 
Expected Significance a 12 3 3 5 
Actual Significance b 32 7 11 17 
Mean Effect -0.007 0.015 -0.007 -0.020 
25th Percentile -0.042 -0.037 -0.039 -0.045 
75th Percentile 0.023 0.053 0.024 0.007 
 
Panel C: Quality of Accruals (R_CHG_WC) 
N per model 5,666 5,666 5,666 5,666 
Test Controls = 0     
F-stat 13.69*** 12.83*** 13.41*** 14.27*** 
Test Manager Fixed Effects = 0     
F-stat 4.52*** 10.22*** 2.13*** 2.96*** 
Test of Manager Coefficients     
N 239 66 66 106 
Expected Significance a 12 3 3 5 
Actual Significance b 51 17 14 23 
Mean Effect -0.003 -0.008 0.002 -0.002 
25th Percentile -0.019 -0.023 -0.011 -0.027 
75th Percentile 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.015 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel D: Abnormal Cash Flow (R_CFO) 
N per model 6,141 6,141 6,141 6,141 
Test Controls = 0     
F-stat 45.82*** 50.26*** 49.26*** 46.72*** 
Test Manager Fixed Effects = 0     
F-stat 4.56*** 10.51*** 2.21*** 2.31*** 
Test of Manager Coefficients     
N 238 66 66 106 
Expected Significance a 12 3 3 5 
Actual Significance b 41 13 12 17 
Mean Effect 0.002 0.013 -0.009 0.002 
25th Percentile -0.035 -0.032 -0.036 -0.037 
75th Percentile 0.036 0.045 0.020 0.035 
     
Panel E: Abnormal Production (R_PROD) 
N per model 6,043 6,043 6,043 6,043 
Test Controls = 0     
F-stat 18.16*** 19.03*** 18.68*** 21.88*** 
Test Manager Fixed Effects = 0     
F-stat 4.18*** 5.22*** 4.85*** 3.46*** 
Test of Manager Coefficients     
N 240 66 67 107 
Expected Significance a 12 3 3 5 
Actual Significance b 66 23 24 26 
Mean Effect -0.002 -0.007 0.007 -0.004 
25th Percentile -0.044 -0.049 -0.035 -0.044 
75th Percentile 0.038 0.047 0.035 0.033 
 
Panel F: Abnormal Discretionary Expenses (R_DX) 
N per model 6,269 6,269 6,269 6,269 
Test Controls = 0     
F-stat 24.74*** 26.24*** 28.13*** 26.81*** 
Test Manager Fixed Effects = 0     
F-stat 4.68*** 6.50*** 5.42*** 3.37*** 
Test of Manager Coefficients     
N 240 66 67 107 
Expected Significance a 12 3 3 5 
Actual Significance b 69 20 28 28 
Mean Effect -0.014 -0.023 -0.012 -0.008 
25th Percentile -0.058 -0.068 -0.081 -0.056 
75th Percentile 0.046 0.053 0.053 0.046 
     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a These values represent the number of manager-specific coefficients I would expect to be significant at the 5% level 
for a random sample of observations. 
b These values represent the actual number of manager-specific coefficients that are significant at the 5% level. 
This table reports the results from regressing the applicable FIN_RPT variable on the CONTROL variables, FIRM and 
YEAR fixed-effects, and the AC, CEO, and CFO fixed-effects.  Column (1) represent the model including all of the 
manager-effects in the same model.  Columns (2) through (4) include the same control variables, firm and year fixed-
effects, but separately include AC-effects individually, CEO-effects individually, and CFO-effects individually.  The 
panels within the table report the results for each dependent variable, and each panel contains separate F-tests 
examining the significance of the control variables and the manager fixed-effects as a group.  Also, each panel 
examines the number of individually significant manager-specific coefficients based on robust standard errors and the 
distribution of the coefficients for the manager-effects.  Refer to the Appendix for detailed variable definitions. 
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 First, consistent with prior earnings management studies, the results of the F-
statistic examining whether the control variables are significant to the model as a whole 
(―Test of Controls = 0‖) suggest that at least some of the control variables are significant 
within the models.  Next, the second F-test examining the significance of the manager-
effects (―Test of Manager Fixed Effects = 0‖) indicate that, at least collectively, the 
manager-specific fixed-effects are significant to the models.  In untabulated analyses, I 
also find that F-statistics for each of the three manager groups in column (1) are 
significant, which suggests that audit committee chairs, CEOs, and CFOs as separate 
groups are significantly associated with the FIN_RPT measures, even when controlling 
for the influence of the other manager groups.  Similarly, columns (2) through (4) also 
suggest that the significance is not driven by one particular management group as the F-
statistic is significant when separately adding the AC, CEO, and CFO indicator variables. 
 Along with the F-statistics, I also examine the number of significant coefficients 
for the individual manager fixed-effects to determine whether the results are driven by a 
few influential managers (―Test of Manager Coefficients‖).  If they are, the number of 
significant coefficients should be no greater than what would be expected from a random 
sample.  The results in each panel indicate that the number of significant manager-
specific coefficients far exceed the number of coefficients that would be expected under 
the null at the 5% level.5  For instance, in Panel A, column (1), there are 237 individual 
managers within the model.  In a random sample, I would expect no more than 12 
significant coefficients at the 5% level.  However, in that particular model, there are 41 
                                                     
5 This result also holds if I examine the significance at the 10% and 1% levels. 
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manager fixed-effects significant at the 5% level.  Last, I examine the distribution of the 
managers’ coefficients, and consistent with prior studies, the difference between the 25th 
percentile and 75th percentile indicates significant variation in each individual manager’s 
accrual- and real earnings management-based styles.   
 The results thus far support H1 and, consistent with the predictions provided by 
UE theory, suggest that individual managers are significantly associated with corporate 
reporting and operating decisions.  Specifically, these results indicate that audit 
committee chairs, CEOs and CFOs all appear to influence accounting- and non-
accounting-based decisions.  These results extend the findings in Ge et al. (2011) because 
they suggest that CEOs and CFOs both have managerial styles that influence corporate 
reporting and operating decisions.  Additionally, these results add new findings to the 
literature on individual managers because they suggest that individual audit committee 
chairs also influence corporate reporting and operating decisions, even when controlling 
for the influence of individual CEOs and CFOs.  This last result is consistent with survey 
evidence by Beasley et al. (2009).  Although some of the survey responses indicate an 
ineffective audit committee, the survey evidence also indicates some audit committee 
members provide substantive oversight of the financial reporting process, particularly 
high risk areas related to revenue recognition, and some members extensively review 
management’s judgments, estimates, and assumptions. 
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5.1.1 Additional Tests of Individual Managers’ Influence 
Although the results just discussed support H1, the analysis does not address a 
separate question of whether the managers in this study influence earnings differentially.  
For example, the results indicate that all three management groups in this analysis 
influence reporting and operating decisions, but they do not speak to whether certain 
styles dominate across the three groups.  To address this question, I examine differences 
between the management groups for the estimated coefficients obtained from the models 
in Table 3, column (1), which includes all of the managers within the same model.  The 
results of this analysis are presented in Table 4. 
As presented in Table 4, the mean value of the audit committee chair coefficients 
from the discretionary accrual model in Table 3, column (1), Panel A, is -0.005.  
Similarly, the mean values of the coefficients for CEOs and CFOs from the same model 
are 0.008 and -0.014, respectively.  Although the differences between the means is not 
significant when comparing the ACs with CEOs or ACs with CFOs, the difference is 
significant (p-value <0.05) between CEOs and CFOs.  Relating the sign of the means to 
the earnings management literature suggests that while all three management groups have 
particular styles concerning discretionary accrual decisions, CEOs, on average, report 
more positive discretionary accruals, while CFOs report more negative discretionary 
accruals, and the difference between them is significantly different.  The signs of the 
mean values of the coefficients from the quality of accruals, abnormal cash flow, and 
abnormal production models suggest a similar result, but the differences between these  
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TABLE 4 
Tests of Individual Managers’ Coefficients 
 
Mgr Group N Mean p-value  Mgr Group N Mean p-value 
         
Discretionary Accruals  Abnormal Cash Flow 
         
AC 66 -0.005   AC 66 0.013  
CEO 66 0.008 0.454  CEO 66 -0.008 0.228 
         
AC 66 -0.005   AC 66 0.013  
CFO 105 -0.014 0.617  CFO 106 0.001 0.478 
         
CEO 66 0.008   CEO 66 -0.008  
CFO 105 -0.014 0.047  CFO 106 0.001 0.360 
         
Absolute Discretionary Accruals  Abnormal Production 
         
AC 66 0.013   AC 66 -0.007  
CEO 66 -0.007 0.295  CEO 67 0.006 0.474 
         
AC 66 0.013   AC 66 -0.007  
CFO 105 -0.019 0.067  CFO 107 -0.005 0.903 
         
CEO 66 -0.007   CEO 67 0.006  
CFO 105 -0.019 0.291  CFO 107 -0.005 0.421 
         
Quality of Accruals  Abnormal Discretionary Expenses 
         
AC 66 -0.008   AC 66 -0.025  
CEO 66 0.002 0.153  CEO 67 -0.015 0.694 
         
AC 66 -0.008   AC 66 -0.025  
CFO 106 -0.002 0.380  CFO 107 -0.008 0.443 
         
CEO 66 0.002   CEO 67 -0.015  
CFO 106 -0.002 0.448  CFO 107 -0.008 0.719 
 
This table examines the coefficients for the individual manager fixed-effects estimated in Table 3, column (1).  Each 
box represents the coefficients obtained for each of the FIN_RPT variables.  Within each box, I report the number of 
coefficients for each manager group (N), the mean value of the coefficients for each group (Mean), and the p-values 
from a t-test examining whether there is a significant difference between the means.  
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means are not statistically significant.  Along with the significance of each manager 
group within the same model, the results of this analysis are important because they 
suggest that individuals serving in management positions associated with the reporting 
and operating process can influence corporate decisions in particular directions, even 
when controlling for the influence of other management positions at the company. 
Due to the dataset design, there is a concern that my results show significance due 
to a random event occurring at one of the managers’ firms which has a similar influence 
on the corporate decision. (Bamber et al. 2010; Dyreng et al. 2010) Although the time 
period and number of managers involved in my sample decrease the probability of this 
alternative explanation, I address this concern by examining the persistence of the 
managers’ styles across both firms.  This test also addresses the question of whether 
significance for my manager effects is driven by just one of the manager’s firms in my 
sample.  Specifically, I follow the test approach in Dyreng et al. (2010) and obtain the 
residual values from equation (1), excluding the manager-specific effects from the model.  
This allows the individual managers’ effects to reflect themselves in the residual.  Then, 
for each of the individual managers that were identified as significant at the 5% level 
from the results reported in Table 3, column (1), I calculate two mean residual values for 
each manager corresponding to their tenure at their first and second firm.  Using the mean 
residual values, I then regress the mean residual from the manager’s second firm on the 
mean residual from their first firm.  The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5. 
The tests of persistence presented in Table 5 indicate significantly positive 
coefficients (at the 5% and 10% level) for all of the FIN_RPT measures, except absolute 
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discretionary accruals.  A significantly positive coefficient on the mean residual from the 
first firm suggests that the significant managers in the primary analysis are not driven by 
their influence at only one of the companies in the sample.  Rather, these results show 
persistent decisions across both of the manager’s firms. 
In addition to the persistence of the manager effects, I also examine the influence 
of dataset design on my results by randomizing the firm-manager pairings.  After 
randomizing the data, I would not expect significance for the manager-specific effects 
because this process assigns the managers to a firm-year for which they do not work.  For 
this test, I determine the number of significant manager-specific coefficients when 
applying the primary models presented in Table 3, column (1), to the randomized data.  
The process of randomizing the data and estimating the manager-specific coefficients is 
repeated 1,000 times to create an empirical distribution based on the number of 
significant managers.  In untabulated results, I find that the means of the distributions for 
all six FIN_RPT measures are around 7% of the 241 managers in the sample, which is far 
less than the number of significant managers identified in the primary analysis and only 
slightly above the 5% that we would expect from a random sample.  These results 
provider further support that dataset design is not driving the significance of my primary 
results. 
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TABLE 5 
Tests of Persistence of Manager-Effects Across Companies 
 
 
DISC_ ACR 
ABS_ 
DISC_ACR R_CHG_WC R_CFO R_PROD R_DX 
       
FIRST_MEAN_RESID  0.473*** 0.394 0.330** 0.648*** 0.288* 0.400** 
Constant -0.006 -0.014 -0.008 0.007 -0.008 0.008 
       
Observations 39 31 45 39 64 68 
adj-R2 0.288 0.0347 0.0760 0.248 0.0404 0.0786 
       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
This table reports results examining the persistence of manager-effects across both companies in the sample.  For this test, each manager with a significant coefficient 
in Table 3, column 1, is identified.  Then, for those managers, mean residual values are calculated for both their first and second firm and only during the manager’s 
tenure.  The mean residual values for the second firm are then regressed on the mean residual values for the first firm.  Estimated coefficients for the manager’s mean 
residual values from the first firm are presented below for each FIN_RPT measure. 
 
 
36 
 
 
36 
To date, this area of literature relies on fixed effect models to separate the 
incremental effect of the individual manager on firms’ policies and decisions.  However, 
if there is no correlation between the fixed effect and the explanatory variables, then a 
random effect model is a more efficient modeling approach. (Wooldridge 2002)  
Although I would expect correlation between the firm effects and the explanatory 
variables used in this analysis, I also examine whether random effects modeling can be 
used in this case based on the Hausman test.  Across all six FIN_RPT measures, the p-
values for the tests (untabulated) reject the null of no difference in the parameter 
estimates obtained from the fixed and random effects models.  This suggests that a fixed 
effects modeling approach is more appropriate in this case. 
Last, I examine whether industry effects are significantly influencing my results 
by examining the distribution of significant managers across the industries in the sample 
(Dyreng et al. 2010).  Using Fama-French 17-industry classifications, I find (untabulated) 
that the number of industries containing a significant manager, with the significant 
managers for each FIN_RPT measure identified by the results in Table 3, column (1), 
ranges from 10 out of 17 to 16 out of 17 industries.  Thus, it appears that industry effects 
are not driving my results. 
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5.2 Tests of Intervening Variables 
 In this set of analyses, I examine whether the association between individual 
managers and reporting and operating decisions is influenced by limits to managerial 
discretion or job demands (H2a and H2b).  To examine this research question, I rely on a 
testing approach similar to that employed in Ge et al. (2011).  That is, I split the sample 
into two groups based on whether the individual manager’s average discretion and job 
demands across their career are more or less than the median discretion and job demands 
for the entire sample.  To do this, I calculate the individual managers’ average measure 
for each of the governance and job demand proxies based on the firm-years specific to 
each manager, across the firms for which the manager works, and only including the time 
periods covered by the individual managers’ tenure at each firm.  Results for the 
managerial discretion analysis are presented in Table 6, and the results for the job 
demands analysis are presented in Table 7. 
Each panel within the tables reports the results from regressing model (1) on each 
manager group segregated by the individual discretion and job demands proxies, but for 
brevity, I only report the number of manager-specific indicator variables included in each 
model, the number of observations per regression analysis, and the F-statistic for the 
manager-specific fixed-effects.  Consistent with H2a and H2b, I expect to find individual 
managers are only significantly associated with the reporting and operating decisions 
when their average governance is less (job demands are greater) than the sample median. 
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Because results are similar across all of the discretion and job demands proxies, I 
do not discuss the results individually, but as indicated by the significance of the F-
statistics in Table 6, the results suggest that, contrary to H2a, individual managers are 
significantly associated with corporate reporting and operating decisions regardless of 
their level of managerial discretion.  Specifically, I do find insignificance for some of the 
managers in both the high governance and low governance settings, but in general, I find 
the F-statistic is significant at the 5% level in both settings.  The results in Table 7 are 
similar and suggest that individual managers influence reporting and operating decisions 
irrespective of the amount of demands placed on the individuals, which is also contrary to 
H2b.   
These results are inconsistent with the portion of Upper Echelon theory that 
suggests managerial influence over corporate decisions varies with the amount of 
discretion afforded to and demands placed on individual managers.  These results could 
suggest that some individual managers’ traits or characteristics significantly reflect 
themselves in corporate decisions regardless of the company’s operating environment. 
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TABLE 6 
Individual Manager Effects by Manager Group and Individual Governance Proxy 
 
 Audit Chairs CEOs CFOs 
 >Govern <Govern >Govern <Govern >Govern <Govern 
Panel A: Results by Big N 
Mgrs per Model 49 17 57 9 97 8 
DISC_ACR 
N per model 1402 438 1679 303 2685 214 
F-stat 2.419*** 3.030*** 1.890*** 0.535 2.690*** 0.757 
ABS_DISC_ACR 
N per model 1402 438 1679 303 2685 214 
F-stat 1.734*** 6.496*** 1.755*** 0.298 1.902*** 2.075** 
R_CHG_WC 
N per model 1298 418 1559 289 2527 209 
F-stat 12.85*** 1.924** 1.968*** 2.769*** 2.940*** 0.903 
R_CFO 
N per model 1435 463 1682 309 2717 224 
F-stat 5.303*** 13.34*** 2.557*** 1.620 2.233*** 4.442*** 
R_PROD 
N per model 1403 472 1652 325 2626 248 
F-stat 4.529*** 4.905*** 5.165*** 1.985** 3.553*** 1.893** 
R_DX 
N per model 1442 502 1684 341 2733 263 
F-stat 7.159*** 2.052*** 5.009*** 5.395*** 3.212*** 1.297 
Panel B: Results by Dominance 
Mgrs per Model 21 45 25 41 36 69 
DISC_ACR 
N per model 560 1280 738 1240 1000 1997 
F-stat 2.380*** 2.818*** 1.807*** 1.449** 2.370*** 2.450*** 
ABS_DISC_ACR 
N per model 560 1280 738 1240 1000 1997 
F-stat 1.230 3.954*** 1.333 1.547** 1.682*** 1.821*** 
R_CHG_WC 
N per model 524 1192 690 1154 960 1867 
F-stat 12.41*** 2.140*** 2.273*** 1.776*** 2.940*** 2.730*** 
R_CFO 
N per model 577 1321 738 1249 1023 2016 
F-stat 1.718** 10.60*** 2.581*** 2.066*** 2.383*** 2.179*** 
R_PROD 
N per model 580 1295 740 1233 981 1990 
F-stat 3.922*** 5.496*** 3.723*** 5.442*** 3.563*** 3.331*** 
R_DX 
N per model 593 1351 769 1252 1039 2055 
F-stat 9.706*** 4.187*** 5.716*** 4.476*** 3.351*** 2.785*** 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
 
 Audit Chairs CEOs CFOs 
 >Govern <Govern >Govern <Govern >Govern <Govern 
Panel C: Results by Market Share 
Mgrs per Model 41 25 41 25 66 39 
DISC_ACR 
N per model 1077 763 1224 776 1822 1169 
F-stat 2.534*** 2.968*** 2.152*** 1.044 2.533*** 2.433*** 
ABS_DISC_ACR 
N per model 1077 763 1224 776 1822 1169 
F-stat 1.502** 6.365*** 1.371* 1.876*** 2.144*** 1.450** 
R_CHG_WC 
N per model 1010 706 1141 723 1732 1089 
F-stat 11.05*** 2.562*** 2.391*** 1.833*** 2.899*** 2.700*** 
R_CFO 
N per model 1114 784 1230 779 1861 1172 
F-stat 3.868*** 10.74*** 2.358*** 2.246*** 2.447*** 1.498** 
R_PROD 
N per model 1097 778 1221 774 1793 1170 
F-stat 2.809*** 6.165*** 3.976*** 6.079*** 3.157*** 3.752*** 
R_DX 
N per model 1135 809 1261 782 1881 1207 
F-stat 6.709*** 4.109*** 4.841*** 4.558*** 3.731*** 2.067*** 
Panel D: Results by Most Clients 
Mgrs per Model 27 39 27 39 49 56 
DISC_ACR 
N per model 673 1167 850 1154 1327 1636 
F-stat 3.139*** 1.868*** 1.508** 1.772*** 1.776*** 3.186*** 
ABS_DISC_ACR 
N per model 673 1167 850 1154 1327 1636 
F-stat 4.864*** 1.798*** 1.622** 1.606** 1.799*** 2.055*** 
R_CHG_WC 
N per model 633 1083 792 1075 1273 1523 
F-stat 2.576*** 14.40*** 1.540** 2.024*** 2.440*** 2.876*** 
R_CFO 
N per model 700 1198 850 1163 1358 1647 
F-stat 10.20*** 6.427*** 2.275*** 2.904*** 2.021*** 2.053*** 
R_PROD 
N per model 691 1184 848 1151 1308 1629 
F-stat 5.876*** 3.634*** 5.111*** 5.184*** 2.530*** 4.543*** 
R_DX 
N per model 723 1221 874 1173 1368 1692 
F-stat 1.912*** 8.132*** 4.056*** 5.668*** 2.123*** 4.105*** 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
 
 Audit Chairs CEOs CFOs 
 >Govern <Govern >Govern <Govern >Govern <Govern 
Panel E: Results by Client Share 
Mgrs per Model 39 27 38 28 58 47 
DISC_ACR 
N per model 1007 833 1157 821 1557 1412 
F-stat 3.074*** 2.087*** 1.391* 1.691** 2.467*** 2.025*** 
ABS_DISC_ACR 
N per model 1007 833 1157 821 1557 1412 
F-stat 2.995*** 2.381*** 1.524** 1.539** 2.160*** 1.695*** 
R_CHG_WC 
N per model 949 767 1080 764 1490 1321 
F-stat 9.114*** 2.250*** 2.232*** 1.949*** 2.760*** 2.589*** 
R_CFO 
N per model 1050 848 1166 821 1595 1423 
F-stat 9.235*** 8.916*** 2.016*** 2.708*** 2.231*** 1.992*** 
R_PROD 
N per model 1047 828 1148 825 1536 1418 
F-stat 4.216*** 3.560*** 3.497*** 6.333*** 2.457*** 4.675*** 
R_DX 
N per model 1089 855 1191 830 1614 1463 
F-stat 4.902*** 6.482*** 3.429*** 5.633*** 2.930*** 2.800*** 
Panel F: Results by Number of Clients 
Mgrs per Model 38 28 42 24 59 46 
DISC_ACR 
N per model 1037 803 1247 735 1734 1281 
F-stat 2.643*** 2.229*** 2.239*** 0.820 2.934*** 2.110*** 
ABS_DISC_ACR 
N per model 1037 803 1247 735 1734 1281 
F-stat 4.304*** 1.568** 1.549** 2.014*** 2.211*** 1.503** 
R_CHG_WC 
N per model 971 745 1168 679 1645 1207 
F-stat 10.95*** 2.408*** 2.104*** 2.561*** 3.504*** 1.970*** 
R_CFO 
N per model 1072 826 1256 735 1761 1303 
F-stat 10.43*** 1.662** 2.569*** 1.881*** 2.126*** 1.982*** 
R_PROD 
N per model 1051 824 1249 728 1716 1285 
F-stat 5.467*** 2.028*** 4.572*** 4.730*** 3.471*** 3.256*** 
R_DX 
N per model 1085 859 1290 735 1792 1331 
F-stat 6.070*** 3.067*** 5.174*** 5.198*** 2.448*** 4.183*** 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
 
 Audit Chairs CEOs CFOs 
 >Govern <Govern >Govern <Govern >Govern <Govern 
Panel G: Results by Institutional Owners 
Mgrs per Model 42 24 36 30 61 44 
DISC_ACR 
N per model 1236 604 1129 871 1762 1255 
F-stat 2.125*** 3.301*** 1.527** 1.973*** 2.484*** 2.280*** 
ABS_DISC_ACR 
N per model 1236 604 1129 871 1762 1255 
F-stat 1.960*** 5.159*** 1.458** 1.751*** 1.871*** 1.968*** 
R_CHG_WC 
N per model 1157 559 1055 809 1671 1184 
F-stat 2.177*** 8.970*** 1.413* 2.986*** 3.166*** 2.494*** 
R_CFO 
N per model 1278 620 1132 877 1794 1272 
F-stat 1.433** 12.15*** 2.239*** 2.720*** 2.519*** 1.723*** 
R_PROD 
N per model 1258 617 1135 860 1754 1247 
F-stat 3.933*** 4.775*** 5.683*** 3.641*** 2.572*** 3.945*** 
R_DX 
N per model 1303 641 1165 878 1809 1316 
F-stat 3.211*** 6.462*** 5.720*** 3.915*** 2.806*** 3.383*** 
Panel H: Results by BOD Size Measure 
Mgrs per Model 38 28 36 30 66 39 
DISC_ACR 
N per model 1057 783 1071 889 1856 1065 
F-stat 2.803*** 3.169*** 1.444** 1.920*** 2.036*** 3.326*** 
ABS_DISC_ACR 
N per model 1057 783 1071 889 1856 1065 
F-stat 1.864*** 5.101*** 1.846*** 1.320 1.696*** 2.301*** 
R_CHG_WC 
N per model 983 733 1001 826 1758 998 
F-stat 3.079*** 10.25*** 1.833*** 2.200*** 2.545*** 3.398*** 
R_CFO 
N per model 1098 800 1080 889 1898 1065 
F-stat 6.373*** 9.390*** 2.218*** 3.269*** 2.421*** 1.820*** 
R_PROD 
N per model 1106 769 1091 864 1868 1028 
F-stat 3.808*** 4.855*** 4.835*** 4.236*** 3.007*** 3.870*** 
R_DX 
N per model 1144 800 1112 891 1946 1072 
F-stat 4.503*** 6.396*** 5.683*** 4.308*** 3.191*** 2.470*** 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
 
 Audit Chairs CEOs CFOs 
 >Govern <Govern >Govern <Govern >Govern <Govern 
Panel I: Results by CEO Duality Measure 
Mgrs per Model 27 39 41 25 48 57 
DISC_ACR 
N per model 851 989 1205 773 1388 1669 
F-stat 2.283*** 2.881*** 1.450** 2.051*** 3.224*** 1.934*** 
ABS_DISC_ACR 
N per model 851 989 1205 773 1388 1669 
F-stat 1.922*** 3.804*** 1.358* 1.894*** 2.214*** 1.949*** 
R_CHG_WC 
N per model 783 933 1125 719 1318 1565 
F-stat 2.342*** 9.710*** 1.939*** 1.735** 2.611*** 2.899*** 
R_CFO 
N per model 866 1032 1214 773 1414 1685 
F-stat 2.713*** 11.02*** 1.640*** 4.135*** 2.118*** 2.172*** 
R_PROD 
N per model 860 1015 1214 759 1404 1626 
F-stat 5.152*** 3.327*** 5.143*** 3.960*** 2.123*** 4.510*** 
R_DX 
N per model 883 1061 1245 776 1450 1704 
F-stat 4.304*** 5.544*** 5.164*** 4.001*** 3.319*** 3.098*** 
       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
This table reports results examining the overall significance of the coefficients on the AC, CEO, and CFO variables 
obtained from regressing the applicable FIN_RPT variable on the CONTROL variables, FIRM and YEAR fixed-
effects, and the AC, CEO, and CFO fixed-effects.  The regression models are run separately for each of the manager 
groups and for each of the high and low governance classifications as determined by the separate managerial discretion 
proxies.  Each panel of his table reports the number individual managers classified as operating in either a high or low 
governance environment.  The number of managers for each classification also represents the number of constraints 
used when calculating the corresponding F-statistic.  The actual number of managers for each FIN_RPT regression 
model may vary slightly due to missing observations.  Each panel also reports the number of observations per model 
(―N per model‖) and the F-test results examining the overall significance of the coefficients on the AC, CEO, and CFO 
variables. 
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TABLE 7 
Individual Manager Effects by Manager Group and Individual Job Demands Proxy 
 
 Audit Chairs CEOs CFOs 
 >Demand <Demand >Demand <Demand >Demand <Demand 
Panel A: Results by Number of Business Segments 
Mgrs per Model 53 13 39 27 65 40 
DISC_ACR 
N per model 1586 254 1142 840 1870 1085 
F-stat 2.520*** 2.967*** 1.529** 1.940*** 2.747*** 1.952*** 
ABS_DISC_ACR 
N per model 1586 254 1142 840 1870 1085 
F-stat 1.642*** 4.957*** 1.671*** 1.284 2.268*** 1.019 
R_CHG_WC 
N per model 1483 233 1064 783 1758 1029 
F-stat 2.459*** 5.610*** 2.103*** 1.547** 2.722*** 3.037*** 
R_CFO 
N per model 1635 263 1151 840 1904 1093 
F-stat 4.201*** 10.02*** 1.798*** 2.250*** 2.704*** 1.558** 
R_PROD 
N per model 1621 254 1152 825 1865 1064 
F-stat 4.317*** 2.560*** 3.471*** 6.925*** 3.552*** 3.220*** 
R_DX 
N per model 1681 263 1183 842 1949 1103 
F-stat 3.750*** 10.55*** 3.799*** 6.066*** 3.279*** 2.739*** 
Panel B: Results by Number of Geographic Segments 
Mgrs per Model 44 22 34 32 71 34 
DISC_ACR 
N per model 1278 562 1024 954 2051 912 
F-stat 2.730*** 2.106*** 2.160*** 1.165 2.836*** 1.517** 
ABS_DISC_ACR 
N per model 1278 562 1024 954 2051 912 
F-stat 2.905*** 3.307*** 2.110*** 1.354* 2.214*** 1.345* 
R_CHG_WC 
N per model 1180 536 954 890 1948 847 
F-stat 11.11*** 2.102*** 1.935*** 2.153*** 3.170*** 1.687*** 
R_CFO 
N per model 1303 595 1027 960 2086 919 
F-stat 10.35*** 1.981*** 2.191*** 2.053*** 2.125*** 1.689*** 
R_PROD 
N per model 1295 580 1032 941 2060 878 
F-stat 3.790*** 4.197*** 4.564*** 3.920*** 2.773*** 4.121*** 
R_DX 
N per model 1333 611 1053 968 2126 934 
F-stat 6.859*** 2.350*** 6.183*** 3.531*** 2.914*** 3.279*** 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
 
 Audit Chairs CEOs CFOs 
 >Demand <Demand >Demand <Demand >Demand <Demand 
Panel C: Results by Size 
Mgrs per Model 42 24 35 31 59 46 
DISC_ACR 
N per model 1244 596 1058 902 1712 1211 
F-stat 2.526*** 3.556*** 1.898*** 1.389* 2.393*** 2.768*** 
ABS_DISC_ACR 
N per model 1244 596 1058 902 1712 1211 
F-stat 1.947*** 4.761*** 1.989*** 1.258 1.745*** 2.269*** 
R_CHG_WC 
N per model 1157 559 983 844 1629 1139 
F-stat 2.330*** 13.97*** 1.514** 2.168*** 3.324*** 2.178*** 
R_CFO 
N per model 1285 613 1061 908 1754 1218 
F-stat 9.176*** 8.523*** 1.807*** 1.977*** 2.119*** 2.053*** 
R_PROD 
N per model 1285 590 1061 894 1728 1180 
F-stat 3.961*** 4.825*** 6.176*** 3.569*** 2.974*** 3.893*** 
R_DX 
N per model 1330 614 1092 911 1802 1229 
F-stat 4.276*** 5.926*** 6.204*** 4.338*** 3.676*** 2.147*** 
Panel D: Results by MTB 
Mgrs per Model 35 31 43 23 66 39 
DISC_ACR 
N per model 973 867 1289 689 1841 1158 
F-stat 2.814*** 2.210*** 1.716*** 1.178 3.311*** 1.221 
ABS_DISC_ACR 
N per model 973 867 1289 689 1841 1158 
F-stat 4.387*** 1.368* 1.707*** 1.426* 2.202*** 1.232 
R_CHG_WC 
N per model 891 825 1194 650 1746 1082 
F-stat 12.44*** 2.821*** 1.711*** 2.185*** 3.043*** 2.117*** 
R_CFO 
N per model 990 908 1289 698 1873 1168 
F-stat 9.041*** 5.306*** 2.605*** 1.378 2.546*** 1.289 
R_PROD 
N per model 953 922 1271 702 1823 1151 
F-stat 4.680*** 3.000*** 5.767*** 2.610*** 3.784*** 2.422*** 
R_DX 
N per model 990 954 1296 725 1885 1211 
F-stat 6.916*** 3.378*** 5.856*** 3.521*** 2.721*** 3.293*** 
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TABLE 7 (cont.) 
 
 Audit Chairs CEOs CFOs 
 >Demand <Demand >Demand <Demand >Demand <Demand 
Panel E: Results by Litigation Exposure 
Mgrs per Model 25 41 24 42 44 61 
DISC_ACR 
N per model 604 1236 713 1265 1275 1704 
F-stat 2.888*** 2.307*** 2.071*** 1.149 2.024*** 2.812*** 
ABS_DISC_ACR 
N per model 604 1236 713 1265 1275 1704 
F-stat 5.708*** 1.519** 2.317*** 1.243 1.442** 2.041*** 
R_CHG_WC 
N per model 551 1165 663 1181 1200 1610 
F-stat 8.990*** 2.566*** 1.589** 1.988*** 3.051*** 2.499*** 
R_CFO 
N per model 613 1285 713 1274 1284 1737 
F-stat 8.847*** 4.113*** 2.605*** 2.023*** 1.909*** 2.273*** 
R_PROD 
N per model 590 1285 704 1269 1247 1706 
F-stat 6.181*** 3.010*** 7.856*** 2.753*** 2.809*** 3.508*** 
R_DX 
N per model 614 1330 713 1308 1292 1784 
F-stat 7.168*** 2.632*** 8.394*** 2.943*** 3.429*** 3.069*** 
Panel F: Results by SOX 
Mgrs per Model 47 19 44 22 77 28 
DISC_ACR 
N per model 1199 641 1370 634 2150 825 
F-stat 2.814*** 1.856** 1.277 2.263*** 2.668*** 2.038*** 
ABS_DISC_ACR 
N per model 1199 641 1370 634 2150 825 
F-stat 3.568*** 1.676** 1.598*** 1.568** 1.841*** 2.143*** 
R_CHG_WC 
N per model 1125 591 1277 590 2027 789 
F-stat 10.15*** 2.333*** 1.572** 2.798*** 3.059*** 1.624** 
R_CFO 
N per model 1242 656 1379 634 2184 840 
F-stat 9.996*** 2.273*** 2.418*** 1.795** 2.246*** 1.958*** 
R_PROD 
N per model 1209 666 1363 636 2144 817 
F-stat 4.453*** 3.359*** 4.820*** 5.669*** 3.641*** 2.711*** 
R_DX 
N per model 1254 690 1389 658 2230 853 
F-stat 5.548*** 4.660*** 4.347*** 6.429*** 3.495*** 1.853*** 
       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
This table reports results examining the overall significance of the coefficients on the AC, CEO, and CFO variables 
obtained from regressing the applicable FIN_RPT variable on the CONTROL variables, FIRM and YEAR fixed-
effects, and the AC, CEO, and CFO fixed-effects.  The regression models are run separately for each of the manager 
groups and for each of the high and low demands classifications as determined by the separate job demands proxies.  
Each panel of his table reports the number individual managers classified as operating in either a high or low demands 
environment.  The number of managers for each classification also represents the number of constraints used when 
calculating the corresponding F-statistic.  The actual number of managers for each FIN_RPT regression model may 
vary slightly due to missing observations.  Each panel also reports the number of observations per model (―N per 
model‖) and the F-test results examining the overall significance of the coefficients on the AC, CEO, and CFO 
variables. 
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5.2.1 Index Measures of Managerial Discretion and Job Demands 
The individual measures for managerial discretion and job demands are not 
independent of each other and collectively exist within the company to varying degrees.  
To ensure that my results are not contingent upon one particular measure and the 
characteristics of that measure, I follow prior studies, such as Gompers et al. (2003) and 
Lara et al. (2009), and develop two index measures based on the proxies discussed above.   
For each firm-year observation, I create an indicator variable for each unique 
managerial discretion and job demand proxy.  Each indicator variable is assigned a value 
of one if the corresponding discretion and demand proxy evidences greater corporate 
governance or job demands for that particular firm-year observation based on a 
comparison with the median value for the sample.  I sum the indicators to create two 
separate governance-related and job demands-related indices for each firm-year 
observation.   Similar to the individual proxies, higher  values of these indices suggest 
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greater governance (i.e., less discretion) and greater job demands.  Using the two index 
values for each firm-year observation, I then calculate manager-specific average 
measures for the governance and job demand indices across each of the firms for which 
the manager works and split the sample using the same procedure discussed above.  The 
results using the indices to split the sample are presented in Table 8.6   
The results of the F-statistic in Table 8 indicate statistically significant manager-
specific fixed-effects in both the high and low governance settings and high and low job 
demands settings.  These results are consistent with the individual discretion and job 
demands measures and suggest that the managers in my sample significantly influence 
corporate reporting and operating decisions regardless of the amount of discretion they 
have or the job demands placed upon those managers.   
  
                                                     
6 Untabulated results show that the means of the average governance index values for AC’s, CEO’s, and 
CFO’s are 4.84, 4.66, and 4.81, and the means of the average demand index values are 3.04, 2.73, and 2.91, 
respectively.  The corresponding median values for the governance index are 5, 5, and 5, while the median 
values for the corresponding demand index are 3, 3, and 3. 
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TABLE 8 
Individual Manager Effects by Manager Group and Index Proxy 
 
 Audit Chairs CEOs CFOs 
 >Govern <Govern >Govern <Govern >Govern <Govern 
Panel A: Results by Governance Index 
Mgrs per Model 30 36 24 42 45 60 
DISC_ACR 
N per model 796 1,044 824 1,198 1,273 1,716 
F-stat 2.324*** 3.010*** 1.989*** 1.423** 2.503*** 2.662*** 
ABS_DISC_ACR 
N per model 796 1,044 824 1,198 1,273 1,716 
F-stat 1.498** 4.529*** 1.266 1.697*** 1.746*** 2.013*** 
R_CHG_WC 
N per model 751 965 767 1,117 1,213 1,616 
F-stat 13.67*** 2.565*** 1.619** 2.103*** 2.804*** 2.548*** 
R_CFO 
N per model 824 1,074 824 1,207 1,304 1,734 
F-stat 4.438*** 9.780*** 2.259*** 2.573*** 2.445*** 1.845*** 
R_PROD 
N per model 805 1,070 806 1,211 1,248 1,727 
F-stat 3.449*** 4.667*** 4.599*** 4.860*** 3.609*** 3.444*** 
R_DX 
N per model 829 1,115 826 1,239 1,309 1,788 
F-stat 6.874*** 4.441*** 4.533*** 4.765*** 3.088*** 2.825*** 
Panel B: Results by Job Demands Index 
 >Demand <Demand >Demand <Demand >Demand <Demand 
Mgrs per Model 39 27 19 47 47 58 
DISC_ACR 
N per model 1,044 796 541 1,437 1,340 1,651 
F-stat 2.564*** 2.118*** 1.928** 1.553** 1.985*** 2.987*** 
ABS_DISC_ACR 
N per model 1,044 796 541 1,437 1,340 1,651 
F-stat 2.918*** 2.160*** 2.729*** 1.281* 1.869*** 1.991*** 
R_CHG_WC 
N per model 969 747 497 1,347 1,271 1,560 
F-stat 10.01*** 2.183*** 1.321 2.052*** 2.932*** 2.686*** 
R_CFO 
N per model 1,077 821 541 1,446 1,374 1,666 
F-stat 11.01*** 2.096*** 2.319*** 2.296*** 1.883*** 1.997*** 
R_PROD 
N per model 1,083 792 553 1,420 1,354 1,622 
F-stat 5.122*** 2.610*** 7.767*** 3.389*** 3.064*** 3.619*** 
R_DX 
N per model 1,121 823 564 1,457 1,414 1,685 
F-stat 5.685*** 4.302*** 8.481*** 3.654*** 3.154*** 2.651*** 
       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
This table reports results examining the overall significance of the coefficients on the AC, CEO, and CFO variables 
obtained from regressing the applicable FIN_RPT variable on the CONTROL variables, FIRM and YEAR fixed-
effects, and the AC, CEO, and CFO fixed-effects.  The regression models are run separately for each of the manager 
groups and for both of the high and low governance and high and low job demands indices.  Each panel of his table 
reports the number individual managers classified as operating in either a high or low demands environment.  The 
number of managers for each classification also represents the number of constraints used when calculating the 
corresponding F-statistic.  The actual number of managers for each FIN_RPT regression model may vary slightly due 
to missing observations.  Each panel also reports the number of observations per model (―N per model‖) and the F-
test results examining the overall significance of the coefficients on the AC, CEO, and CFO variables. 
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5.3 Observable Demographics and Corporate Decisions 
To examine H3, I replace the manager-specific indicator variables in model (1) 
with the demographic measures discussed previously.  This design provides information 
concerning the incremental ability of the demographic proxy to explain variation in the 
company’s reporting characteristics beyond that provided by the firm-specific fixed-
effects.  Descriptive statistics on the individual managers’ biographical information are 
presented in Table 9, Panel A.  A comparison of the demographic characteristics with 
prior studies in this area of literature suggests that the managers’ in my sample are 
comparable.   
The results of the regression analyses are reported in Table 9, Panel B.  Each 
column of Panel B represents a different FIN_RPT measure as the dependent variable, 
and each column corresponds with column (1) of Table 3, except replacing the manager-
specific fixed-effects with the manager-specific demographic measures.  
First, concerning the manager’s age and MBA status, I find that ACs and CEOs 
born before WWII report more negative discretionary accruals (-0.033 and -0.017, 
respectively).  These results suggest that older audit committee chairs and CEOs are more 
conservative in their reporting and operating decisions, consistent with the results in 
Bamber et al. (2010) and Bertrand and Schoar (2003).  Similarly, CFO’s born before 
WWII report higher quality accruals (-0.022), but the same demographic of CEO’s report 
lower quality accruals (0.008).  This demographic measure is not significant in the other 
models.    
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TABLE 9 
Individual Manager Demographics on Financial Reporting Measures 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Data 
 
 AC  CEO  CFO  Total  
N by Manager Type 66  68  107  241 
 
 Frequency %  Frequency %  Frequency %  Frequency %  
             
Master’s Degree 33 50  41 60  69 64  143 59  
MBA Degree 30 45  26 38  62 58  118 49  
Doctorate Degree 2 3  7 10  0 0  9 4  
JD Degree 5 8  11 16  3 3  19 8  
CPA 31 47  6 9  46 43  83 34  
Military Experience 3 5  5 7  4 4  12 5  
International Experience 9 14  13 19  23 21  45 19  
Pre_WWII 16 24  29 43  9 8  54 22  
Mean Birth Year 1952 N/A  1947 N/A  1953 N/A  1951 N/A  
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TABLE 9 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Regression results 
       
 
DISC_ 
ACR 
ABS_ 
DISC_ 
ACR 
R_ 
CHG_ 
WC R_CFO R_PROD R_DX 
AC_PRE_WWII -0.033* 0.011 -0.010 0.020 0.022 -0.011 
CEO_PRE_WWII -0.017* -0.014 0.008* -0.011 -0.008 0.021 
CFO_PRE_WWII -0.016 -0.002 -0.022*** 0.001 -0.011 -0.027 
AC_MILITARY 0.119*** 0.020 0.016 -0.038 0.016 0.011 
CEO_MILITARY 0.030 -0.032 -0.009 0.014 0.012 -0.039* 
CFO_MILITARY 0.035 0.021 0.020*** -0.003 0.027 0.035 
AC_MBA -0.032 0.009 -0.004 -0.016 -0.028* 0.011 
CEO_MBA 0.006 0.041*** 0.008* -0.008 0.031*** -0.010 
CFO_MBA -0.024** -0.019** -0.011*** 0.007 -0.014 0.017 
AC_CPA -0.012 0.021 -0.006 0.001 0.009 -0.014 
CEO_CPA 0.012 -0.077* 0.002 -0.031 0.087*** -0.140** 
CFO_CPA -0.014 -0.004 0.001 0.006 -0.007 -0.025** 
AC_JD -0.061* 0.041 -0.023** 0.053** 0.039 -0.008 
CEO_JD 0.003 -0.000 -0.004 0.006 0.017 -0.021 
CFO_JD 0.021 0.013 0.002 0.004 -0.081*** 0.093*** 
AC_DOCTORATE 0.016 -0.022 0.026 -0.017 -0.093** 0.029 
CEO_DOCTORATE 0.021 -0.023 0.002 0.010 -0.047*** 0.031* 
AC_TOP10 0.029 0.009 0.006 0.043** -0.015 -0.009 
CEO_TOP10 -0.009 -0.048*** -0.010* 0.006 -0.022 -0.006 
CFO_TOP10 0.024** -0.002 0.008* -0.010 0.006 -0.010 
AC_INTERNATIONAL 0.049** -0.006 0.004 -0.024 0.011 -0.024 
CEO_INTERNATIONAL 0.000 0.040* -0.006 -0.009 0.005 0.015 
CFO_INTERNATIONAL -0.021 -0.016 0.001 0.004 0.010 0.004 
       
Observations 6,032 6,032 5,666 6,141 6,043 6,269 
adj-R2 0.319 0.265 0.159 0.410 0.702 0.669 
       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
This table reports the results examining the ability of demographic measures to explain financial reporting decisions.  
Panel A provides descriptive statistics concerning the demographic data.  Frequency shows how many managers 
within the sample have that particular attribute.  % shows the percentage of managers with that attribute compared to 
the total number of managers.  Mean Birth Year represents the average birth year for the managers in the sample.  
Panel B reports the coefficient estimates on the demographic measures obtained from regressing the applicable 
FIN_RPT variable on the CONTROL variables, FIRM and YEAR fixed-effects, and the demographic measures.  
Significance of the coefficients is determined using robust standard errors.  Each column represents a different 
FIN_RPT dependent variable.  Refer to the Appendix for detailed variable definitions. 
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For the manager’s MBA status, I find that CFOs with an MBA report more 
negative discretionary accruals (-0.024), smaller absolute accruals (-0.019), and higher 
quality of accruals (-0.011).  Relating the signs of these coefficients to the earnings 
management literature suggests that CFOs with an MBA report higher quality financial 
results.  Alternatively, CEOs with an MBA report larger absolute accruals (0.041), lower 
quality accruals (0.008), and abnormally high production costs (0.031), which are all 
indicative of lower quality financial results.  Although the results for CFOs with an MBA 
are counter to the arguments that MBA programs engender or encourage aggressive 
management behavior (Bamber et al. 2010), the results for the CEOs are consistent with 
this criticism.  Also, these results are consistent with the previous findings that CFOs 
have significantly more negative discretionary accruals than CEOs. 
Next, the CFO’s CPA status is only significantly negatively associated with 
discretionary expenses, but the results suggest that CEOs with a CPA certification report 
smaller absolute accruals (-0.077), abnormally high production costs (0.087), and 
abnormally low discretionary expenses (-0.140).   This last set of results for the CEO 
provides some evidence that CEOs who are CPAs evidence greater real earnings 
management activities.  Intuitively, I would expect managers who are CPAs to engage in 
less earnings management activities, as suggested by the results for CEOs with a CPA  
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and absolute discretionary accruals, due to training and ethical compliance requirements 
associated with that certification.  However, combining the CEO’s CPA and real 
activities management results with the results for the comparable accrual-based measures, 
these results could suggest that CEO’s who have CPA training rely less on accrual-based 
means to influence earnings and more on real activities management, which is consistent 
with the idea that real activities management draws less scrutiny from auditors and 
regulators. (Chi et al. 2011; Cohen et al. 2008)  
Although this analysis provides little evidence concerning the explanatory ability 
of audit committee chair’s demographics, the results do provide some evidence 
concerning the association between corporate reporting and operating decisions and the 
observable demographics of CEOs and CFOs.  As such, I reject H3.7 
  
                                                     
7 Because theory suggests that limits to managerial discretion and job demands intervene in the association 
between individual managers and corporate decisions, I also examine whether these environmental factors 
influence the association between observable managerial demographics and corporate decisions.  To 
examine this question, I segregate the sample based on more or less managerial discretion and job demands 
as discussed previously.  Then, similar to the analysis presented in Table 6, I replace the manager-specific 
indicator variables with the observable demographic measures available for each manager.  The results 
(untabulated) suggest no clear pattern of significance for the demographic measures between the different 
operating environments.  That is, I obtain significance on some of the demographic measures in both the 
high and low governance environments and high and low job demands environments, which suggests that 
environmental factors do not influence the ability of demographic measures to explain managers’ reporting 
and operating decisions 
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6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 
6.1 Alternative Measures of Reporting and Operating Activity 
 My primary analyses rely on standard measures for discretionary accruals, quality 
of accruals, and real activities management.  Relying on these standard measures 
provides the benefit of making my results generalizable to the broader literature.  
However, recent papers suggest that these measures may suffer from measurement error 
(Cohen et al. 2011; DeFond 2010; Francis et al. 2005a; Jones et al. 2008; Kothari et al. 
2005). 
 To examine the sensitivity of my results, I perform the same analyses discussed 
above using alternative FIN_RPT measures.  Because performance could contribute to 
management turnover within my sample, I include ROA as a control variable in my 
models.  However, Kothari et al. (2005) and Cohen et al. (2011) also suggest that 
discretionary accrual and real earnings management measures require adjustments for 
performance when calculating ―normal‖ values.  Therefore, I also examine the influence 
of performance on the analyses discussed above by including current period ROA in the 
calculation of normal values for each of the discretionary accrual and real earnings 
management measures and, alternatively, using the performance-matched approach 
discussed in Kothari et al. (2005) based on closest current period ROA for each of the 
same measures.  In untabulated analyses, the results are the same when calculating 
normal values including current period ROA as a control variable in the first stage model.  
For the performance-matched approach, the CEOs as a group are not significantly 
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associated with DISC_ACR or R_CFO in the primary models, and ACs are only 
significantly associated with ABS_DISC_ACR at the 0.10 level.  All other inferences are 
similar.  Along with performance adjustments, I also examine the accrual quality model 
adjustments recommended by McNichols (2002).  The adjustments for change in sales 
and PPE do not change the results for R_CHG_WC.  Thus, I conclude that my results are 
robust to these alternative measures.   
6.2 Demographic Measures Explaining Individual Manager’s Styles 
 My primary demographic tests examine whether observable demographic 
measures are directly associated with corporate reporting and operating decisions.  An 
alternate, but related, research question is whether the observable demographic measures 
explain individual manager’s reporting and operating styles.     
 To examine this question, I follow the approach in Bamber et al.’s (2010) and 
regress the coefficients for each individual managers’ fixed-effect on the corresponding 
managers’ demographic measures.  The coefficients are obtained from the primary 
regression models reported in Table 3, column (1), and proxy for the unique reporting 
and operating styles of each individual manager.  Obtaining a statistically significant 
result in these models suggests that a particular demographic measure significantly 
explains the individual manager’s style being examined.   
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 10, and they indicate significance 
for some of the demographic measures across each of the models.  For instance, in the 
discretionary accrual (DISC_ACR) model results presented in Table 10, Panel A, the sign 
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of the MBA, CPA and JD measures are significantly negative which suggests that audit 
committee chairs with these characteristics have styles associated with more negative 
discretionary accruals.  These results are consistent with the literature that suggests audit 
committee members with accounting- and financial-expertise differentially impact 
corporations’ financial reporting decisions. (DeFond et al. 2005; Krishnan and 
Visvanathan 2008)   
Consistent with the results in Table 9, I also find that CEOs with an MBA have 
styles that evidence larger absolute accruals (Table 10, Panel B) and lower accrual quality 
(Table 10, Panel C), while CEOs with a CPA have styles that generate smaller absolute 
accruals (Table 10, Panel B), abnormally high production costs (Table 10, Panel E), and 
abnormally low discretionary expenses (Table 10, Panel F).  These results complement 
my primary findings and suggest that the direct associations between observable 
demographics and the corporate reporting and operating decisions I observed previously 
are not a product of my testing method. 
 
  
58 
 
 
58 
TABLE 10 
Manager-Specific Coefficients on Individual Manager Demographics 
 
 Audit Chairs CEOs CFOs 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Results for DISC_ACR 
MBA -0.077* -0.007 -0.026 
DOCTORATE 0.000 0.020 N/A    
JD -0.116* 0.000 0.023 
CPA -0.075** 0.023 -0.017 
MILITARY 0.116 0.040 0.016 
INTERNATIONAL 0.022 -0.013 -0.024 
PRE_WWII -0.056 -0.029 -0.007 
TOP 10 0.051 -0.000 0.020 
Observations 66 66 105 
High Litigation Exposure 
MBA -0.076 0.085** -0.044 
DOCTORATE -0.062 -0.132* N/A    
JD 0.079 0.088** -0.116** 
CPA 0.074 N/A    0.001 
MILITARY N/A   -0.054 0.044 
INTERNATIONAL -0.030 0.038 -0.023 
PRE_WWII 0.088 -0.013 0.002 
TOP 10 0.016 -0.040 0.034 
Observations 25 24 44 
Panel B: Results for ABS_DISC_ACR 
DOCTORATE -0.013 -0.009 N/A    
JD 0.105 0.030 0.018 
CPA 0.036 -0.064* 0.003 
MILITARY 0.019 -0.036 0.013 
INTERNATIONAL 0.002 0.057* -0.005 
PRE_WWII 0.034 0.002 0.006 
TOP 10 0.021 -0.049* -0.004 
Observations 66 66 105 
High Litigation Exposure 
MBA 0.123 0.011 -0.010 
DOCTORATE -0.119 -0.079 N/A    
JD -0.059 -0.002 0.042 
CPA -0.032 N/A    0.010 
MILITARY N/A    -0.000 0.062** 
INTERNATIONAL 0.194 -0.025 -0.002 
PRE_WWII -0.027 0.017 0.012 
TOP 10 -0.143 -0.026 0.000 
Observations 25 24 44 
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TABLE 10 (continued) 
 
 Audit Chairs CEOs CFOs 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel C: Results for R_CHG_WC 
MBA -0.006 0.014* -0.014 
DOCTORATE 0.023 0.002 N/A    
JD -0.030 -0.001 0.000 
CPA -0.019 0.010 -0.002 
MILITARY 0.027 -0.009 0.017 
INTERNATIONAL -0.001 -0.003 0.002 
PRE_WWII -0.008 0.015** -0.024* 
TOP 10 0.013 -0.012 0.007 
Observations 66 66 107 
High Litigation Exposure 
MBA 0.042 0.002 0.002 
DOCTORATE 0.008 -0.009 N/A    
JD 0.076* 0.028** -0.018 
CPA -0.015 N/A    0.001 
MILITARY N/A    0.015 0.029 
INTERNATIONAL -0.039 -0.003 -0.028* 
PRE_WWII 0.072** 0.014 -0.020 
TOP 10 0.015 0.015 0.003 
Observations 25 24 44 
Panel D: Results for R_CFO 
MBA -0.034 -0.004 0.017 
DOCTORATE -0.019 0.006 N/A    
JD 0.071 0.017 0.008 
CPA 0.022 -0.033 0.013 
MILITARY -0.033 0.020 -0.010 
INTERNATIONAL -0.031 0.001 0.011 
PRE_WWII 0.022 0.003 -0.001 
TOP 10 0.049 0.002 -0.014 
Observations 66 66 106 
High Litigation Exposure 
MBA 0.022 -0.040 0.014 
DOCTORATE -0.008 0.082 N/A    
JD -0.089 -0.078** 0.065 
CPA -0.043 N/A    0.021 
MILITARY N/A    -0.025 -0.014 
INTERNATIONAL -0.050 -0.020 0.002 
PRE_WWII -0.070 -0.002 -0.013 
TOP 10 -0.015 -0.019 -0.003 
Observations 25 24 44 
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TABLE 10 (continued) 
 
 Audit Chairs CEOs CFOs 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel E: Results for R_PROD 
MBA -0.003 0.018 -0.024 
DOCTORATE -0.064 -0.040 N/A    
JD 0.077 0.011 -0.085* 
CPA 0.032 0.078* -0.014 
MILITARY 0.014 0.034 0.044 
INTERNATIONAL 0.032 -0.013 0.011 
PRE_WWII 0.030 -0.026 -0.026 
TOP 10 -0.031 -0.013 0.001 
Observations 66 67 107 
High Litigation Exposure 
MBA -0.160* 0.017 0.062 
DOCTORATE 0.147 -0.075 N/A    
JD -0.087 0.021 -0.051 
CPA -0.051 N/A    0.021 
MILITARY N/A    -0.210 -0.041 
INTERNATIONAL -0.002 0.069 0.005 
PRE_WWII 0.010 -0.023 -0.027 
TOP 10 0.108 -0.005 -0.039 
Observations 25 24 44 
Panel F: Results for R_DX 
MBA 0.000 -0.008 0.020 
DOCTORATE 0.080 0.027 N/A    
JD -0.009 -0.058 0.097 
CPA -0.020 -0.164*** -0.022 
MILITARY 0.029 -0.058 0.019 
INTERNATIONAL -0.024 0.031 0.000 
PRE_WWII 0.017 0.022 -0.007 
TOP 10 0.028 0.004 -0.001 
Observations 66 67 107 
High Litigation Exposure 
MBA 0.114 -0.032 -0.042 
DOCTORATE 0.022 -0.015 N/A    
JD 0.032 -0.016 -0.073 
CPA 0.062 N/A    0.022 
MILITARY N/A    0.259 0.036 
INTERNATIONAL -0.032 -0.065 -0.019 
PRE_WWII 0.054 0.006 -0.033 
TOP 10 0.083 0.119 0.010 
Observations 25 24 44 
    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
This table reports the results from regressing the coefficients for the manager-specific fixed-effects estimated in Table 
3, column 1, on the demographic data obtained for each individual manager.  Each panel within the table represents a 
different FIN_RPT variable and reports the parameter estimates for the demographic measures when coefficient 
estimates were obtained from the primary regression results and when the coefficients estimates were obtained only 
for those managers identified as operating in a highly litigious industry in Table 6.  Intercepts are included in each 
model but are omitted for brevity. 
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Because particular demographics may reflect themselves more in some settings, I 
also apply this alternative testing approach to those companies and managers that are 
identified as operating in a highly litigious industry based on my splitting technique and 
regress the individual managers’ coefficients on the demographic measures, because the 
significance of a Juris Doctorate degree on managers’ decisions should be most apparent 
in this particular setting.  The results of this analysis are also reported within Table 10. 
Although the results suggest other demographics are also significant in this 
particular setting, the results also show that CEOs’ with a Juris Doctorate degree have 
styles that generate positive discretionary accruals (Table 10, Panel A), lower quality of 
accruals (Table 10, Panel C), and abnormally low cash flows (Table 10, Panel D).  
Focusing just on the managers in the high litigation environment only produces 24 
manager coefficients available for testing, so I am cautious about drawing conclusions 
based on this analysis.  However, these results do provide additional evidence that 
observable demographics are associated with individual managers’ styles in meaningful 
ways. 
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6.3 Interrelationships between Manager’s Demographics 
 Although demographics are observable, individuals are not typically defined or 
completely influenced by one particular event or experience.  For instance, attending a 
―Top 10‖ MBA program might influence a manager’s decisions, but that manager likely 
does not solely rely on that experience when making decisions.  Rather, individuals’ 
decisions and cognitive frames likely reflect the culmination of experiences that occur 
throughout their lifetime, which should result in interrelated influences across and within 
the managers in my sample.  Because this aspect of demographic testing has not been 
examined previously in this literature, I take an exploratory approach to examining this 
issue. 
 To examine the interrelationships between the demographics and whether those 
interrelationships explain managers’ reporting styles, I rely on an approach discussed in 
Johnson (1998).  First, I calculate the correlation coefficients for the individual managers’ 
demographic measures.  The results of this analysis are presented in Table 11, Panel A.  
The correlation coefficients are based on the correlations of the demographic measures 
discussed previously for each of the 241 individual managers identified in the primary 
sample. 
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TABLE 11 
Grouping of Demographic Measures 
 
Panel A: Correlation Coefficients 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
MASTERS (1) 1.00          
MBA (2) 0.81 1.00         
DOCTORATE (3) 0.12 -0.11 1.00        
JD (4) -0.23 -0.26 -0.07 1.00       
CPA (5) -0.24 -0.15 -0.14 -0.08 1.00      
MILITARY (6) 0.19 0.20 -0.05 -0.07 -0.09 1.00     
INTERNATIONAL (7) 0.03 -0.02 0.13 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 1.00    
BIRTH_YEAR (8) -0.10 -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 0.25 -0.14 -0.05 1.00   
PRE_WWII (9) -0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.24 0.06 -0.03 -0.72 1.00  
TOP_10 (10) 0.37 0.45 -0.13 -0.06 -0.07 0.06 0.11 -0.01 0.04 1.00 
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TABLE 11 (continued) 
Panel B: Regression Results 
 
          
DISC_ ACR 
ABS_ 
DISC_ ACR 
R_ 
CHG_ 
WC R_CFO R_PROD R_DX 
       
AC_GRP1 -0.010 0.008 0.003 0.006 -0.029** 0.006 
CEO_GRP1 0.009 0.006 -0.005 -0.000 0.012 -0.011 
CFO_GRP1 0.000 -0.014* -0.004 0.004 -0.006 0.003 
AC_GRP2 0.037** -0.005 0.005 -0.010 -0.004 -0.017 
CEO_GRP2 0.004 0.006 -0.005 -0.002 -0.022* 0.029** 
CFO_GRP2 -0.022 -0.014 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.011 
AC_GRP3 -0.008 0.024* -0.006 0.004 0.011 -0.016 
CEO_GRP3 0.008 -0.065 0.006 -0.035 0.094*** -0.140** 
CFO_GRP3 -0.015* -0.005 0.001 0.005 -0.013 -0.017* 
AC_GRP4 -0.022 0.014 -0.010 0.018 0.020 -0.012 
CEO_GRP4 -0.021** -0.015* 0.009** -0.011 -0.004 0.015 
CFO_GRP4 -0.015 -0.003 -0.021*** -0.004 -0.007 -0.021 
Constant 0.160*** 0.217*** 0.095*** -0.081* -0.238*** 0.379*** 
       
Observations 6,032 6,032 5,666 6,141 6,043 6,269 
adj-R2 0.317 0.264 0.158 0.410 0.701 0.669 
       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
This table examines the interrelationships between the demographic measures and whether the demographic measures 
combine to better explain companies reporting and operating decisions.  Panel A of this table provides correlation 
coefficients for each of the demographic measures.  Significant correlation coefficients at the 5% level are indicated 
in BOLD.  The observations used to calculate the correlation coefficients equal the 241 individual managers identified 
in the primary sample.  Panel B of this table presents regression results after grouping the demographic measures 
based on the correlations identified in Panel A.  For an explanation of the specific demographics included within each 
grouping, see discussion in the text. 
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As indicated in Table 11, Panel A, MASTERS, MBA, and TOP_10 are all 
significantly positively correlated at the 5% level, with MASTERS and MBA having the 
highest positive correlation of 0.81.  As such, I group these demographics into one 
measure by creating an indicator variable (GRP_1) equal to one if the individual 
manager has any of these characteristics, and zero otherwise.  Although those 
correlations are not surprising, one interesting finding from this analysis is that 
MILITARY is also significantly positively correlated with MASTERS and MBA.  As 
such, I also include those with military experience in GRP_1.  Similar to GRP_1, I next 
define GRP_2 based on an indicator variable equal to one if the manager has a doctorate 
degree or international experience due to a significantly positive correlation coefficient 
of 0.13 (Table 11, Panel A).   
 For the remaining variables, I note the following.  First, CPA and JD are both 
significantly negatively associated with MASTERS and MBA, but not significantly 
associated with one another.  This result is consistent with prior studies that suggest 
different career tracks for those with a finance, accounting, or legal background.  
Second, I note that CPA is positively associated with BIRTH_YEAR and negatively 
associated with PRE_WWII, which both suggest that younger managers are more likely 
to have a CPA certification.  Considering the significantly negative associations between 
these demographic measures, I create an indicator variable for each of these measures.  
Specifically, GRP_3 is equal to one if the manager is a CPA, and zero otherwise.  
GRP_4 is equal to one if the manager was born before World War II (i.e., pre_WWII is 
equal to one), and GRP_5 is equal to one if the manager has a JD degree.  Although this 
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approach could still allow for the same manager to evidence multiple characteristics 
(e.g., GRP_1 and GRP_4 equal one for the same manager), a scan of the resulting 
classifications indicates that none of the individual managers have all of these 
characteristics (i.e., the ―GRP‖ indicator variables are not all equal to one for any 
particular manager).   
When I replace the individual demographic measures in Table 9 with the GRP_1 
through GRP_4 demographic measures (GRP_5 being the base group), I find, as 
presented in Table 11, Panel B, no clear pattern of significance for the ―GRP‖ variables.  
In fact, I lose some significance for the GRP variables compared to the individual 
demographic measures.  For example, none of the GRP_1 variables are significantly 
associated with the discretionary accrual or accrual quality measures, where some of the 
MBA variables were previously significant.  However, this analysis does indicate that 
CEO’s with a CPA (i.e., GRP_3) have particular styles concerning abnormal production 
and discretionary expenses.     
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Relying on neoclassical economic and agency theories, many prior studies 
assume that individual managers are not significant determinants of corporate policies 
and decisions.  However, recent studies suggest that individual manager’s ―styles‖ can 
impact corporate policies and decisions in economically meaningful ways (Bamber et al. 
2010; Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Dyreng et al. 2010; Ge et al. 2011).  To explain these 
findings, this stream of literature relies on the assumptions and predictions provided by 
Upper Echelon theory (Hambrick and Mason 1984).  This theory posits that an 
individual’s bounded rationality results in incomplete analyses and a tendency to rely on 
their own personal ―experiences, values and personalities‖ when analyzing outcomes. 
(Hambrick 2007)  As a result, individual characteristics may evidence themselves in 
corporate policies and decisions.  Consistent with this theory, I examine whether 
individual managers influence corporate reporting and operating decisions. 
 The results of my primary analysis are consistent with the theory and suggest that 
individual audit committee chairs, CEOs, and CFOs are all significantly associated with 
corporate reporting and operating decisions.  Specifically, the results suggest that these 
individuals influence non-accounting-based activities (i.e., real activities measures), as 
well as accounting-based activities (i.e., accrual-related measures).  However, I also find 
that the influence of these individuals is not impacted by the environment in which they 
operate.  That is, I find that the level of managerial discretion and job demands do not 
significantly intervene in the association between these individual managers and their 
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accounting- and non-accounting-based activities.  Last, I explore whether the association 
between individual managers and corporate reporting and operating decisions is 
explained by observable demographics.  My results suggest that some observable 
demographic characteristics, such as the manager’s age, MBA and CPA status, explain 
some of their decisions, and the directional nature of these decisions appears to vary with 
the manager’s position at the company.   
My results provide strong evidence that individual managers are significantly 
associated with companies’ accrual-based and real activities-based decisions, and this 
association is not influenced by the environment in which the manager operates.  These 
results are important because they increase our knowledge concerning the determinants 
of corporate reporting and operating decisions, and they suggest that each of the 
management groups examined in this study significantly influence corporate reporting 
decisions, even though audit committee chairs are tasked with monitoring and 
overseeing inside management and CFOs technically report to CEOs.    
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APPENDIX 
 
To obtain the expected values discussed below, I require at least 15 observations with 
non-missing data for each fiscal year and 2-digit SIC combination.  Unless otherwise 
indicated, specific variable references refer to variable names within the Compustat 
database. 
FINANCIAL REPORTING MEASURES 
 The model used to measure discretionary accruals (DISC_ACRit) equals: 
SC_TA it = 1 CONSTANT it + 2 SC_CHG_SALE it + 3 SC_PPE it +  it   
where SC_TAit is total accruals for firm i, calculated as income before extraordinary 
items (IBit) minus operating cash flows (OANCFit) and cash flows for extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations (XIDOCit) in year t; CONSTANTit equals 1 divided 
by assets at the beginning of the year (ATit-1); SC_CHG_SALEit equals change in sales 
(SALEit) minus prior period sales (SALEit-1); SC_PPEit equals gross property, plant & 
equipment (PPEGTit).  SC_TA, SC_CHG_SALE, and SC_PPE are scaled by ATit-1.  
 Discretionary accruals (DISC_ACRit) equal the difference between the 
company’s actual total accruals (SC_TA it) and expected accruals based on the above 
model.  Expected accruals are calculated with the adjustment for change in receivables.  
Absolute values of discretionary accruals (ABS_DISC_ACR it) are calculated using 
DISC_ACR it. 
 The model used to measure accrual quality (R_CHG_WCit) equals: 
CHG_WC it = 0 + 1 LAG_CFO_DD it + 2 CFO_DD it + 3 LEAD_CFO_DD it +  it
   
where CFO_DDit is operating cash flows (OANCFit) divided by average total assets 
[(ATit + ATit-1)/2]; LAG_CFO_DDit is lagged operating cash flows (OANCFit-1) divided 
by average total assets; LEAD_CFO_DDit equals one period ahead operating cash flows 
(OANCFit+1) divided by average total assets; CHG_WCit equals negative one times the 
sum of change in accounts receivable (RECCHit), change in inventory (INVCHit), 
change in accounts payable (APALCHit), change in income taxes payable (TXACHit) 
and change in net other assets (AOLOCHit) scaled by average total assets.  RECCH, 
INVCH, APALCH, TXACH, and AOLOCH are set to zero if missing.  Accrual Quality 
(R_CHG_WCit) equals the difference between the company’s actual change in working 
capital (CHG_WCit) and expected values based on the above model.   
 The model used to measure abnormal cash flow (CFO_REMit) equals: 
CFO_REM it = 1 CONSTANT it + 2 SC_SALES it + 3 SC_CHG_SALE it +  it 
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where CFO_REMit equals operating cash flows (OANCFit) minus cash flows for 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (XIDOCit); CONSTANTit equals 1 
divided by assets at the beginning of the year (ATit-1); SC_SALESit equal current period 
sales (SALEit); SC_CHG_SALE it equals sales (SALEit) minus prior period sales 
(SALEit-1).  CFO_REM, SC_SALES, and SC_CHG_SALE are scaled by ATit-1.  
Abnormal cash flow (R_CFO it) equals the difference between the company’s actual 
operating cash flow (CFO_REM it) and expected values based on the above model.   
 The model used to measure abnormal production (R_PRODit) equals: 
PROD it = 1 CONSTANT it + 2 SC_SALES it + 3 SC_CHG_SALE it  
+ 4 SC_LAG_CHG_SALE it +  it 
where PRODit equals cost of goods sold (COGSit) plus change in inventory from prior 
period (INVTit – INVTit-1); SC_LAG_CHG_SALEit equals prior period sales (SALEit-1) 
minus two period lagged sales (SALEit-2).  PROD and SC_LAG_CHG_SALE are scaled 
by ATit-1.  Abnormal production (R_PRODit) equals the difference between the 
company’s actual production (PRODit) and expected values based on the above model.   
 The model used to measure abnormal discretionary expense (R_DXit) equals: 
DISCEXP it = 1 CONSTANT it + 2 SC_LAG_SALES it +  it 
where DISCEXPit equals the sum of advertising  (XADit), R&D (XRDit) and SG&A 
(XSGAit) expenses; SC_LAG_SALESit equals prior period sales (SALEit-1).  XAD, 
XRD and XSGA are set to zero if missing.  DISCEXP and SC_SALES are scaled by 
ATit-1.  Abnormal discretionary expenses (R_DXit) equal the difference between the 
company’s actual discretionary expenses (DISCEXPit) and expected values based on the 
above model.   
CONTROL VARIABLES 
ROA = net income (NIit) scaled by average total assets 
SIZE_AT = natural log of total assets (ATit) 
BTM = total stockholders’ equity (SEQit) divided by market value of equity 
(PRCC_Fit*CSHOit) 
GROWTH = difference between current and prior period sales (SALE) scaled by 
prior period sales 
SC_LEV = total liabilities (LTit) scaled by total assets (ATit) 
GOVERNANCE MEASURES 
BIG_N = 1 if the client’s auditor (AU) is either Arthur Andersen, Arthur Young, 
Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touch, KPMG, PwC, or 
Touche Ross 
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The following auditor specialization measures were calculated based on the entire 
Compustat dataset and then matched with my sample of firms. 
MKT_SHARE = sum of each auditor’s client sales (SALE) per fiscal year and 2-
digit SIC code divided by the sum of total sales (SALE) per fiscal year 
and 2-digit SIC 
MKT_DIFF = difference in MKT_SHARE between the largest and second 
largest audit suppliers for each fiscal year and 2-digit SIC code 
DOMINANCE = 1 if the client’s auditor is the largest audit supplier for the fiscal 
year and 2-digit SIC code based on client sales (SALE) and the difference 
in market share (MKT_DIFF) is at least 10% between the largest and 
second largest audit supplier 
NCLIENTS = sum of the number of audit clients per fiscal year and 2-digit SIC 
code for each audit firm 
CL_SHARE = sum of the number of audit clients per fiscal year and 2-digit SIC 
code for each audit firm (NCLIENTS) divided by the sum of the number 
of total audit clients per fiscal year and 2-digit SIC code 
MOST_CLTS = 1 if the client’s audit firm is the clear leader based on its number 
of audit clients per fiscal year and 2-digit SIC code 
INST = total number of shares held by institutions (SHARES) divided by total 
shares outstanding (CSHO); Source: Thompson Financial and Compustat 
BOD_SIZE = total number of members on the company’s board of directors; 
Source: Corporate Library (DIRECTORSTOTAL), Risk Metrics 
(DIRECTORS_TOTAL), and hand-collected data 
CEO_DUAL = 1 if the CEO also serves as the Chair of the board of directors; 
Source: Corporate Library (CEOISCHAIRMAN), Risk Metrics, and 
hand-collected data 
JOB DEMAND MEASURES 
N_SEG_BUS = total number of business segments; Source: Compustat 
N_SEG_GEO = total number of geographic segments; Source: Compustat 
MTB = market value of equity (PRCC_F*CSHO) divided by total stockholders’ 
equity (SEQ) 
LIT = 1 if the company’s SICH equals 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-
5961, or 7370 
SOX = 1 if the fiscal year (FYEAR) is greater than or equal to 2002 
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